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Foreword
It is my pleasure and honor, on behalf of the Public Oversight Board, to present this ninth report of 
the Board.
In response to questions and criticisms raised in the course of Congressional hearings, but also in 
significant measure because of the accounting profession's on-going efforts to maintain and improve the 
quality of financial reporting, a number of initiatives were undertaken, both by the profession and by others 
during the past year. The Auditing Standards Board published ten proposals for new or revised standards 
which, among other things, are intended to narrow the gap between the public's expectations and the profes­
sion's standards with respect to the detection of fraud, to involve the auditor to a greater extent in assessing 
the adequacy of a client's internal controls, and to increase the responsibility of the auditor with respect to 
the assessment of the likelihood of the client's continued existence. The National Commission on Fraudu­
lent Financial Reporting (the Treadway Commission) published for public comment a draft report containing 
far-reaching recommendations to assure the heightened integrity of the financial reporting process. The 
AICPA's Special Committee on Standards of Professional Conduct for Certified Public Accountants (the 
Anderson Committee) made numerous recommendations intended to assure the long-term relevance and 
effectiveness of the profession, and the Institute's Council has approved them for balloting by the member­
ship later in 1987.
One recommendation of the Anderson Committee was put to a vote of the membership during the 
year—a proposal to make membership in the SEC Practice Section (which the Board oversees) mandatory 
for firms auditing SEC registrants if their partners were to retain their AICPA memberships. Although the 
proposal garnered an impressive 61 percent affirmative vote, that fell short of the two-thirds required to 
effect a bylaw change.
The failure of the Institute's membership to approve this proposal was disappointing. However, the 
SEC has moved to achieve the same end by proposing that any accounting firm that audits an SEC registrant 
must be a member of a peer review organization that requires at least triennial peer reviews and has a public 
oversight body subject to SEC oversight. The Board has strongly endorsed the objective of this proposal since 
our experience with the AICPA's program has provided us with incontrovertible evidence of the value of peer 
review in assuring high quality audits.
The year has witnessed continuous improvement in the procedures for conducting peer reviews and 
in the operations of the Special Investigations Committee. Particularly noteworthy has been the strengthen­
ing of the procedures of the latter Committee by the adoption of a more structured investigative approach, 
coupled with greater flexibility in reviewing documentation related to allegedly failed audits.
On a more personal note, during the past year, Arthur Wood, the last of the original members of the 
Board, submitted his resignation as chairman and despite the strong urgings of his fellow Board members 
also resigned from the Board. We miss his wisdom, his experience, his gentle and consistent leadership.
Joining us to replace Art Wood is Robert F. Froehlke. Like Art, Bob has had a distinguished career 
in business, having recently retired as chairman of the Equitable Life Assurance Society and begun another 
career as chairman of IDS Mutual Fund Group in Minneapolis. His fellow Board members are delighted that 
he has consented to add the duties of a Board member to his other substantial commitments.
Respectfully submitted,
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Highlights and 
Insights
" The Public Oversight Board is p leased  to be ab le  to report 
 once again that the self-regulatory program o f the SEC Prac­
tice Section functioned w ell during 1986-87 under the capa­
ble guidance o f  its com m ittees and is m aintaining and improving the quality o f  practice o f  its 
m em ber firms. The Section's peer review s have been conducted with thoroughness and when defi­
ciencies in or noncom pliance with firm s’ system s have been discerned, the Peer Review  Com m it­
tee has been unremitting in insisting that corrective m easures be taken. The Special Investigations 
C om m ittee has conscientiously probed  the quality  control im plications o f  audit failures alleged in 
litigation and has dem an ded  changes w here its findings indicated that the quality controls 
needed  to be strengthened. The Board is also p leased  to report that w henever the Section’s Peer 
R eview  or Special Investigations C om m ittees concluded that im provem ents in the quality control 
system o f  a m em ber firm  w ere necessary, the firm  prom ptly and willingly m ade the recom ­
m en ded  changes."
The SEC Practice Section of the AICPA Division for CPA Firms is a voluntary member­
ship organization intended for firms that audit SEC registrants, although many firms that have no 
SEC clients have chosen to become members. The Section is responsible for developing and con­
ducting a program to assure that the quality controls of its member firms are adequate and that 
they are complied with. The principal tool used to achieve this goal is the triennial peer review to 
which each member firm must submit. In addition, member firms must comply with stringent 
membership requirements that also operate to assure enhanced quality in the conduct of audits of 
SEC registrants.
The Board has carefully overseen the 
activities of the Section since its inception. In 
doing this, it has, with the assistance of its excel­
lent professional staff, reviewed the activities of 
both the Peer Review C o m m itte e  and Special 
Investigations Committee through various 
means. As in past years, Board representatives 
attended each meeting of the Peer Review Com­
mittee and its Evaluations and Recommenda­
tions Subcommittee and applied one of its three 
oversight programs to each of the 127 reviews 
conducted in 1986.
In the course of performing the 127 reviews, peer reviewers concluded that 12 audits— 
less than one percent of all those reviewed—were not reported on properly or were not performed 
in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards. In each case, the Peer Review Commit­
tee deferred processing the peer review report until the Committee had been provided evidence 
that the firm had taken or had planned to take appropriate action.
Evaluation of Quality Control Systems
o f Firm s P eer R eview ed in 1986
No reportable deficiencies noted 10
Corrective action recommended 105
Corrective action required in
certain key policies and procedures 12
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During the year, the Special Investiga­
tions Committee opened or reopened files on 46 
cases alleging a firm had failed to conduct an 
audit of an SEC registrant in accordance with 
professional standards. It was able to close its 
files on 50 cases during the year, being assured, 
where appropriate, that the firms involved had 
taken appropriate corrective actions, but it 
referred two of those cases to the Professional 
Ethics Division for further review of the per­
formance of specific individuals.
A number of improvements have been 
made in the Section's programs based on accu­
mulated experience and perceived needs. Heed 
has been paid to the problem of "opinion shop­
ping," which has distressed both the SEC and 
responsible members of the profession, by add­
ing a new membership requirement and incorpo­
rating in the peer review program procedures to 
assure that member firms have not accommo­
dated "opinion shoppers." Other peer review 
performance and reporting procedures have also 
been refined as needed.
Initiatives and proposals to improve the quality of audits were advanced by several enti­
ties in addition to the Section: the Securities and Exchange Commission, the "Treadway Commis­
sion," the Auditing Standards Board, and the AICPA's "Anderson Committee." The significant 
audit quality features of each of these initiatives are commented on in the Board's report.
The procedures of the Special Investigations Committee have been more formally struc­
tured. Although the Committee focuses on the broad quality control implications of allegations 
rather than on the specifics of a given case, provision has been made for the Committee and its 
task forces to access selected workpapers prepared in connection with the audits being litigated.
As a result of these strengthened procedures and more detailed reporting to the SEC, the Board is 
hopeful that the SEC will soon be able to express full confidence in the effectiveness of the special 
investigations program, as it has with respect to the peer review program.
The Board commends all of those asso­
ciated with the Section for their dedication of 
time, energy, and professional skill to this in­
creasingly effective program to maintain and 
increase the quality of audits by its member 
firms. While it is impossible to quantify the 
number of substandard audits that have been 
avoided as a result of this program, the experi­
ence of those associated with it fully justifies 
the conclusion that great benefits to the public 
have flowed from it.
Membership
SEC
Practice
Section
Division 
for CPA 
Firms
At July 1, 1986 381 1553
At June 30, 1987 395 1710
Summary of SIC Activity
Case files open at July 1, 1986 33
Case files opened or reopened during year 46
Case files closed during year:
After concluding that allegations had 
no quality control implications 14
After concluding that the firm's quality 
controls were not deficient 26
After obtaining assurance that the 
firm had made or would make appropriate 
changes in its quality controls 10
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Report of the 
Board
Introduction 
and Summary 
Conclusion
The Pu blic  Ov e r s ig h t  Bo a rd  is pleased to be able to report 
once again that the self-regulatory program of the SEC Prac­
tice Section functioned well during 1986-87 under the ca­
pable guidance of its committees and is maintaining and improving the quality of practice of its 
member firms. The Section's peer reviews have been conducted with thoroughness and when defi­
ciencies in or noncompliance with firms' systems have been discerned, the Peer Review Commit­
tee has been unremitting in insisting that corrective measures be taken. The Special Investiga­
tions Committee has conscientiously probed the quality control implications of audit failures 
alleged in litigation and has demanded changes where its findings indicated that the quality con­
trols needed to be strengthened. The Board is also pleased to report that whenever the Section's 
Peer Review or Special Investigations Committees concluded that improvements in the quality 
control system of a member firm were necessary the firm promptly and willingly made the rec­
ommended changes.
Before reporting on the activities of the Board, it is appropriate to comment briefly on the 
actions that have been taken by others within and without the accounting profession to maintain 
and improve the quality of auditing in the United States.
During the past year, the role and responsibility of the auditor, and the quality of auditing 
generally, were the focal points of several major studies and activities. The Auditing Standards 
Board of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants issued exposure drafts on ten 
proposed standards. The major ones, when adopted, will (a) clarify the auditor's responsibility for 
the detection of errors, irregularities, and illegal acts, (b) clarify the auditor's responsibility for eval­
uating and reporting on internal controls, (c) provide for expanded communication of matters to 
audit committees, and (d) establish standards for conducting an examination of management's 
discussion and analysis. Adoption of these standards will clarify or increase the role of the inde­
pendent auditor and should enhance further the credibility of the auditor's report.
A wide-ranging study of the financial reporting system in the United States was con­
ducted by the independent National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting chaired by 
former SEC Commissioner James C. Treadway, Jr. The Commission studied the roles and inter­
relationships of persons and organizations involved in the financial reporting process in the 
United States and made a series of recommendations, several of which deal with the role and 
responsibility of the auditor.
The Securities and Exchange Commission recently published for comment a proposal 
which would require that financial statements filed with the Commission be certified by an audi­
tor whose accounting and auditing practice has been subjected to an independent peer review 
within the prior three years.
Several other activities of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants are 
directly aimed at improving the quality of audit practice in the U.S. The AICPA Special Commit­
tee on Standards of Professional Conduct for Certified Public Accountants issued a report recom­
mending far-reaching changes in the profession's code of professional ethics, mandatory continu­
ing professional education, mandatory participation in a quality review program, and additional 
educational requirements for entry into the profession. The Council of the Institute has endorsed 
these recommendations and they are to be submitted to the membership for vote in late 1987.
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While the paramount responsibility of the Public Oversight Board is to oversee the activi­
ties of the SEC Practice Section, the Board has a keen interest in any and all initiatives to improve 
the quality of audit practice, including those which originate outside the SEC Practice Section. 
Because of the far-reaching effects of the ten proposed revisions to auditing standards being consid­
ered by the Auditing Standards Board, members of our staff were instructed to monitor closely and 
report on any and all developments regarding the proposed changes in the role and responsibility 
of the auditor. In addition, members of the Public Oversight Board, either individually or as a body, 
met with several other groups to discuss the issues and current developments regarding the 
accounting profession and its self-regulatory program.
The primary objective of the SEC Practice Section of the AICPA Division for CPA Firms 
is to maintain and improve the quality of the accounting and auditing practice of member firms 
before the Securities and Exchange Commission. This annual report describes the Board's over­
sight of the Section's programs, the initiatives of the Section and those of other organizations to 
maintain and improve audit quality. The Board neither has nor needs line authority over the Sec­
tion. Our suggestions for the development and refinement of the policies, standards, and opera­
tions of the Section are given serious consideration by the Section and are generally adopted. The 
Section's activities are described in greater detail in the appendices.
Board The Board consists of five members who are not involved in the public
Activities accounting profession and whose backgrounds provide a broad spectrum
of experience.
Arthur M. Wood, who was the last remaining charter member of the Board, retired from 
the Board effective December 31, 1986. A. A. Sommer, Jr., who had been vice chairman, was 
elected to succeed Mr. Wood as chairman and Robert K. Mautz was elected vice chairman. Robert 
F. Froehlke joined the Board in July 1987. Melvin R. Laird and Paul W. McCracken continued their 
services as Board members.
The Board chairman attends meetings of the Section's Executive and Planning Commit­
tees. Mr. Mautz is the Board's liaison with the Special Investigations Committee and attends most 
of its meetings and some meetings of its task forces. Other Board members also occasionally 
attend meetings of the Section's committees.
The Board is assisted by a staff of four experienced CPAs and two administrative person­
nel. Richard A. Stark, a partner in the New York law firm of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, 
has served as the Board's legal counsel since its inception.
The Board meets monthly to consider issues as they arise and to review events since the 
last meeting. During the year, the Board also met formally or informally with various individuals 
or groups to discuss the Section's self-regulatory program and other initiatives to improve audit 
quality.
■ In July 1986, the Board met in open meeting with members of the Securities and Exchange Com­
mission which oversees private sector processes for setting accounting and auditing standards as 
well as the activities of the SEC Practice Section. The meeting was used to exchange views on 
the effectiveness and credibility of the special investigative process, the performance of manage­
ment advisory services for audit clients, and other issues of mutual interest. It is the intention 
of the Board to meet annually with the Commission to discuss topics of current interest.
■ In July 1986, the Board met with the Honorable Charles A. Bowsher, Comptroller General of the 
U.S. to exchange views on the quality of audits of governmental agencies, disciplinary actions 
taken by accounting firms, and other issues.
■ In July 1986, the Board convened a meeting of the house counsels of eleven major CPA firms to 
discuss the special investigative process and the effects of proposed changes in auditing stan­
dards on litigation risk of CPA firms.
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Board Members
  A. A. Sommer, Jr., Chairman, 1986-; joined Board in 1983; SEC Commissioner, 1973-76; 
Partner in Washington, DC law firm of Morgan, Lewis & Bockius specializing in 
securities law.
▼ Robert K. Mautz, Vice Chairman, 
joined Board in 1981; Professor Emeri­
tus of the University of Illinois and the 
University of Michigan.
► Arthur M. Wood, Chairman, 1984-86; char­
ter member of the Board, Chairman of the 
Board and Chief Executive Officer of Sears, 
Roebuck and Co., 1973-78.
  Melvin R. Laird, joined Board in 1984; nine-term 
U.S. Congressman, 1953-69; Secretary of Defense, 
1969-73; Counsellor to the President, 1973-74; 
Senior Counsellor for National and International 
Affairs, The Reader’s Digest Association, Inc.
► Paul W. McCracken, joined Board in 
1985; Chairman of the President’s 
Council of Economic Advisers, 1969-71; 
President of the American Enterprise 
Institute for Public Policy Research, 
1986; Edmund Ezra Day Distinguished 
University Professor Emeritus of 
Business Administration, Economics, 
and Public Policy at University of 
Michigan.
► Robert F. Froehlke, joined 
Board in 1987; Secretary 
of the Army, 1971-73; 
Chairman of the Board of 
Equitable Life Assurance 
Society, 1982-87; President 
and CEO of IDS Mutual 
Fund Group.
Legal Counsel
T  Richard A. Stark, Legal Counsel to Board since 
1977; partner in New York law firm of Milbank, 
Tweed, Hadley & McCloy specializing in securi­
ties law.
Staff Members
Louis W.  Matusiak, Execu­
tive Director since 1978; 
partner in Alexander Grant 
& Company, 1964-78; Direc­
tor of Professional Develop­
ment, AICPA, 1958-64;
Professor, University of 
Detroit, 1950-57, Chairman 
of Accounting Department, 
1953-57.
Charles J. Evers, Technical 
Director since 1980; senior 
staff member of FASB, 
1977-80; Peat, Marwick, 
Mitchell & Co., 1961-77, 
audit partner in New York 
office, 1971-77.
Alan H. Feldman, Assistant 
Technical Director since 
1980; Touche Ross & Co., 
1969-80, Director of Profes­
sional Standards Review in 
Boston office, 1978-80.
John F. Cullen, Assistant 
Technical Director since 
January 1987; Manager, 
AICPA SEC Practice Sec­
tion, 1979-81; Associate 
Director of Quality Control, 
KMG Main Hurdman, 
1981-87.
■ In January 1987, the Board met with Audit­
ing Standards Board Chairman Jerry Sullivan 
and AICPA Vice President Dan Guy to discuss 
audit quality initiatives to close the "expecta­
tion gap" concerning auditor responsibility 
and performance.
■ In February 1987, the Board met with Michael 
Barrett, chief staff aide to Congressman John J. 
Dingell, Chairman of the Subcommittee on 
Oversight and Investigations of the House 
Committee on Energy and Commerce, to 
review current developments in the accounting 
profession's self-regulatory program and 
initiatives undertaken to improve the quality 
of audit practice.
■ In March 1987, the Board met with John C. 
Burton, former SEC Chief Accountant and 
currently Dean and Arthur Young Professor of 
Columbia University Graduate School of Busi­
ness, to discuss the objectives of self-regula­
tion.
■ In April 1987, the Board met with Wallace E. 
Olson to gain the benefit of his views and per­
spectives on the effectiveness of the self-regula­
tory program and the role of the Board. Mr. 
Olson, who was then AICPA President, played 
a key role in the establishment of the Division 
for CPA Firms.
■ In May 1987, the Board met with representa­
tives of the Section to discuss the concurring 
partner review membership requirement.
Throughout the year, Chairman Sommer 
maintained an active liaison with members and 
staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
and the National Commission on Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting.
Such meetings provide the Board with 
valuable outside perspectives to supplement the 
detailed written and oral reports of its staff. Thus, 
the Board has general access to information and 
viewpoints essential in evaluating the effective­
ness of the Section's self-regulatory program and 
the adequacy of initiatives affecting the profession.
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The Board and its staff monitor all activities constituting the peer re­
view process. Representatives of the Board attend meetings of the Peer 
Review Committee and its Evaluations and Recommendations Sub­
committee and the Board's staff reviews each peer review performed.
As in prior years, one of the POB's three oversight pro­
grams was used to evaluate the performance on each peer review conducted in 1986:
■ Visitation and workpaper review program—observation of the performance of the field work, 
attendance at the exit conference during which the review team reports its findings and recom­
mendations to management of the reviewed firm, and review of the review team's workpapers, 
reports, and the reviewed firm's response, or
■ Workpaper review program—review of the review team's workpapers and reports and the firm's 
response, or
■ Report review program—review of the review team's reports and selected portions of its work- 
papers, and the firm's response.
Scope of Board Oversight of 1986 Peer Reviews Classified by Number of SEC Registrants 
Audited by Reviewed Firms
  Visitation and Workpaper Review   Workpaper Review   Report Review
The specific oversight program applied to a given review is determined by a number of 
factors including:
■ Attributes of the reviewed firm:
□ Number of SEC registrants it audits.
□ Size of its professional staff.
□ Number of times it has been peer reviewed and type of report received on its last review.
□ Type of POB oversight program used to evaluate its prior review.
■ Attributes of the review team:
□ Performance of team captain on prior reviews.
□ Type of POB program used to evaluate the team captain's performance on prior reviews.
Application of this approach results in some reviews being assigned automatically to 
the visitation-workpaper review program. The type of oversight program assigned to other reviews 
is on a random basis.
When the visitation-workpaper review program is applied to the review of a multi-office 
firm, the program calls for POB staff to observe the performance of the review team at one or more 
operating offices, to attend exit conferences held at such operating offices, and to attend the final 
conference at which the review findings are reported to top management. As a result, POB staff
Oversight of the 
Peer Review 
Process
Firms with 5 or more SEC clients Firms with 1 to 4 SEC clients Firms with no SEC clients
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members, at times accompanied by a Board member, attended a total of 76 operating and final exit 
conferences held in conjunction with reviews of the 49 firms to which the POB applied its most 
intensive oversight program.
Representatives of the Board attended each of the five meetings the Peer Review Commit­
tee held during the year. POB representatives also attended each meeting of the Evaluations and 
Recommendations Subcommittee. Based in large part on the review by AICPA staff of the review 
teams' workpapers, the Subcommittee recommends whether the Committee should accept the 
review team's report as submitted and whether such acceptance should be conditioned upon the 
reviewed firm agreeing to take specified corrective action. The Board's staff communicates the 
results obtained from the application of its oversight programs to the Subcommittee and occasion­
ally to the full Committee. All differences of opinion between the POB staff and the Committee as 
to whether an individual review was conducted and reported on in accordance with standards are 
reported to and discussed in detail by the Board.
The Board finds its access to the peer review process of the Section entirely satisfactory. 
Since POB representatives have "privilege of the floor," the POB's views are made known and con­
sidered by the Committee in making its decisions on setting or revising established standards and 
administrative procedures. Discussion at Committee meetings is free and frank. Board and staff 
members have adequate opportunity to express their views and criticisms which are duly consid­
ered by the Committee.
An important procedural change was made during the year at the Board's suggestion. 
While Committee members had previously abstained from voting on the acceptance of peer 
review reports in which they had an interest as either a member of the review team or reviewed 
firm, the Committee changed its administrative procedures to require such Committee members 
to absent themselves during the Committee's discussion of the peer review report.
The Board is convinced that the peer review program is functioning effectively and accom­
plishing the purposes for which it was intended.
The Board's staff also evaluates the Committee's monitoring program. In cases where the 
review team uncovered significant negative findings, the Committee requires the firm, as a condi­
tion for accepting its peer review report, to take specific corrective action and to provide evidence 
to the Committee that such action achieved the intended result. The Board commends the review 
teams for their diligence in requiring firms to adhere to standards. The Committee is also to be 
commended for its insistence that each and every review be performed and reported on in strict 
accordance with standards and for its insistence that firms whose quality control systems are 
found to be in need of significant revision provide the Committee with evidence that appropriate 
corrective actions have been implemented effectively. However, the Board is concerned about the 
amount of time it takes to resolve problems encountered in some reviews. As a result, there is 
delay in requiring such firms to implement the corrective actions considered necessary. Sixteen 
reports of 1986 peer reviews were unprocessed as of June 30, 1987, even though the field work for 
all but one of these reviews was completed at least five months earlier. The Board has urged the 
Committee to examine its procedures and take such action as may be required to expedite the 
processing of problem reviews.
Improvements in Quality of Practice Peer review is enhancing the quality of accounting 
and auditing services performed by member firms. Most firms that were reviewed in 1986 and had 
had a prior review had improved their quality controls and compliance therewith; however, seven 
firms received a less desirable report. The Board especially commends five firms, each of whom 
had made significant improvements in its quality control system following receipt of a qualified 
report in the prior review so as to receive an unqualified report in 1986.
The Board notes, however, that three firms that had received qualified reports on their 
prior reviews had not implemented effective corrective actions and thus received qualified reports 
again in 1986. Two of the reviews were accelerated reviews; the third firm, whose prior review 
had been in 1983, had been found on an earlier revisit by the team captain to have implemented 
revised policies and procedures and corrected the deficiency. The 1986 review team concluded,
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however, that the firm had reverted to its former practices, thus resulting in the firm's receiving 
another qualified peer review report. The Committee is subjecting the corrective action plans of 
these three firms to extensive and intensive monitoring. The Committee is also planning to moni­
tor the implementation of the action plans of the seven firms that had received unqualified reports 
on their prior reviews but received qualified reports in 1986.
The situations described in the preceding paragraph evidence the need for a firm to have 
its quality control system independently reviewed every three years and for the Peer Review Com­
mittee to obtain assurance that a firm is effectively implementing corrective actions, when such 
corrective actions are considered mandatory to give the firm reasonable assurance of conforming 
with professional standards in the performance of accounting and auditing engagements.
Ninety seven firms reviewed in 1986 received unqualified peer review reports as they had 
in 1983. However, all but nine of these firms received a letter of comments concerning their qual­
ity controls or compliance therewith.
(Left) SECPS Executive Committee Chairman John Abernathy attended a small group luncheon to express the Section's appreciation to outgoing 
POB Chairman Art Wood and to congratulate Al Sommer on being named Mr. Wood’s successor. (Right) AICPA President Phil Chenok with POB 
members Mel Laird and Bob Mautz at outgoing POB chairman's “farewell lunch.”
In an attempt to quantify the improvement in quality of practice effected as a result of 
the peer review process, the Board's staff coded and analyzed the deficiencies reported in the let­
ters of comments issued to firms reviewed in 1986 and those reported in letters of comments 
issued to these firms on their immediately prior peer review. After excluding comments relating to 
application of auditing standards that became effective within the three-year period, our analysis 
showed a marked decline in deficiencies relating to the element of supervision. As a result, 
engagements reviewed in 1986 had considerably fewer instances of misapplication of generally 
accepted auditing standards. On the other hand, deficiencies in planning audits increased, reflect­
ing, we believe, evaluation by the peer review process of compliance with Statement on Auditing 
Standards No. 47, "Audit Risk and Materiality in Conducting an Audit," which was required to be 
applied for audit periods beginning after June 30, 1984. Similarly, there was an increase in deficien­
cies cited in the conduct of audits relating to audit sampling which, we believe, reflects reviewer 
evaluation of compliance with Statement on Auditing Standards No. 39, "Audit Sampling," which 
was required to be applied on engagements with periods ending on or after June 25, 1983.
The fact that there is need for improved audit planning and conduct of audits in those 
respects further underscores the value of peer review as a mechanism that enforces compliance 
with new or revised auditing standards. It is apparent that there is a learning curve in the imple­
mentation of new standards across all firms from the largest to the smallest. Peer review, we 
believe, accelerates the learning and implementation processes. Our Board believes that this will 
be especially significant to the public interest as firms discharge their audit responsibility when 
and if the ten new standards now being considered for issuance by the Auditing Standards Board 
are adopted.
The Board strongly believes in the importance of private regulation, that is, the internal
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monitoring and review and resultant quality control improvement that occurs within firms. For 
that reason, we were disappointed by a rise in deficiencies concerning the internal inspection pro­
gram of firms particularly with respect to the timeliness of inspection and implementation of cor­
rective action by some firms. We applaud the strong action taken by the Peer Review Committee 
which has required such firms to demonstrate improved quality in these respects by having to 
submit future performance of their inspections to Committee oversight.
In summary our analysis of comparative peer review results and first-hand impressions 
gained through our staff oversight program lead us to conclude that peer review has had and will 
continue to have an important role in the enhancement of quality controls of Section member 
firms. The Board has made the details of its special analysis available to the Committee for its use 
in providing guidance to review teams.
Concurring Partner Review  The Board believes that review of an audit engagement by a 
partner in addition to the engagement partner can and should provide a firm with significant addi­
tional assurance that its engagements are performed in all material respects in accordance with 
professional standards. Review by a second or concurring partner, however, is required only for 
audits of SEC registrants and certain other specified types of companies performed by firms that 
are members of the SEC Practice Section. Neither generally accepted auditing standards nor qual­
ity control standards require that audits be subjected to review by a partner other than the engage­
ment partner.
The concurring partner review membership requirement has recently been strengthened 
by the Section—in large part at our urging—essentially to require that certain workpapers as well 
as the audit report and financial statements be subjected to review by the second partner. The 
effectiveness of the implementation of the expanded requirement will be first tested in peer 
reviews conducted in 1987.
An analysis made by the Board's staff revealed a wide variation in the procedures adopted 
by firms to assure compliance with the concurring partner review membership requirement. A 
firm is allowed considerable discretion in defining the procedures that its concurring reviewers are 
to perform; further, each firm is allowed to stipulate the degree or amount of additional assurance 
it is to derive from review by the concurring review partner.
As a result, the Board met in May 1987 with 
representatives of the Section's Peer Review and Special 
Investigations Committees to discuss the Board's analy­
sis. That discussion confirmed the existence of wide 
differences of opinion among CPA firms as to how 
much additional assurance a concurring partner review 
should provide and the amount of responsibility that 
the concurring reviewer should be assigned for the qual­
ity of the audit. Such differences exist even among the 
large national firms. We were further advised that very 
few firms charge a concurring reviewer with responsi­
bility for doing so comprehensive a review as to provide 
the firm with positive assurance that the audit was con­
ducted in accordance with generally accepted auditing 
standards and that the financial statements were pre­
pared in all material respects in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. How­
ever, the Board notes that the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting seems to 
concur that these are appropriate objectives of a concurring partner review. The Commission rec­
ommends that such review should provide the firm with assurance that the audit was designed 
(and performed) so as to detect fraudulent financial reporting.
The Board is concerned about the differences regarding the degree of assurance that a 
concurring partner review should provide. We are aware that two firms can have equally effective
SECPS Peer Review Committee Chairman Dave 
Pearson, shown with POB Chairman Al Sommer, 
headed a small delegation of Section representa­
tives to discuss the concurring partner review 
requirement at the May 1987 Board meeting.
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quality control systems and yet have quite different quality control procedures. Further, equally 
effective methods of documenting the results of auditing procedures—i.e., the form, content, and 
organization of workpapers—can and do vary widely among firms. Thus, the Board recognizes 
the difficulty inherent in specifying procedures that all firms should require of their concurring 
review partners. However, the Board believes that the Section should more clearly define the de­
gree of assurance that a concurring review should provide and has urged the Section to give 
further consideration to clarifying the objective of concurring review.
The Board concurs with the National Commission's recommendation that the scope of 
the concurring review should be designed to reduce the incidence of fraudulent financial reporting. 
The Board believes that a concurring partner review should be required of all auditing firms, or 
alternatively at a minimum to audits of public companies. Accordingly, we have recommended 
that the Auditing Standards Board consider incorporating a concurring partner review requirement 
into the quality control standards, and issuing guidance to firms as to how and when it should be 
applied.
The Special Investigations Committee (SIC) was organized late in 
  1979 as a supplement to the peer review program. The SIC grew out 
of the belief by the Section that when a suit was brought against a 
Section member, immediate inquiry should be made as to whether 
the charges might indicate a deficiency in the firm's quality controls or its compliance with them 
or whether they might indicate a need for clarification of professional standards. Thus, the Section 
adopted a membership requirement calling on member firms to promptly report to the Section 
any suit brought against them or their personnel either by the SEC or a private party involving 
the audit of a client that files financial reports with the SEC or other government regulators 
pursuant to SEC regulations.
The purpose of the special investigative process is not to investigate whether the charges 
in the suit are justified. Those determinations are made by the SEC and the civil courts. For the 
Section or the SIC to undertake such an inquiry and determination would be a costly and needless 
duplication of processes that already exist.
A task force of SIC members is assigned to each case. The task force reads the financial 
statements in question and reviews other available relevant information and applicable accounting 
and auditing literature.
In many cases it is clear from a mere reading of the complaint that the charges made have 
no relevance to the work of the auditor; for instance, they do not charge any departure from 
accounting principles or auditing standards.
When the complaint does 
allege an audit failure, the task force 
initiates discussions with members of 
the defendant firm (frequently includ­
ing personnel associated with the sub­
ject audit) concerning the case and 
often examines relevant guidance 
materials issued by the firm. If 
through these procedures the task 
force is unable to satisfy itself that the 
firm's quality controls, as they relate 
to the allegations in the suit, are ade­
quate, the task force may recommend 
to the SIC that a "special review" be 
performed with respect to all or only 
to specific relevant quality controls of the firm. If at any stage the task force determines that the 
firm is deficient in its quality control procedures or compliance with them, it will recommend to
POB Vice Chairman Bob Mautz frequently attended meetings of the SIC in his 
capacity as Board liaison to the Special Investigations Committee.
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Oversight of the 
Special Investigate 
Process
the SIC that the firm be required to take the necessary corrective measures, and these recommen­
dations are typically confirmed by the Committee. In every instance to date, the firms have com­
plied with demands and suggestions made.
Oversight of SIC Activities in 1986-87 The Board exercises close oversight of the activi­
ties of the SIC. Vice Chairman Robert K. Mautz has served as the Board's liaison to the SIC for 
several years, and members of the staff have attended all such meetings as well as most task force 
meetings. The staff typically reads the financial statements pertinent to the case, related corre­
spondence, relevant accounting and auditing literature, and usually attends meetings with firm 
personnel to discuss quality control implications of the allegedly faulty engagement.
Members of the Board's staff, often accompanied by Mr. Mautz, attended (a) each of the 
six meetings held by the Committee during the year, (b) a substantial majority of meetings of SIC 
task forces with representatives of firms involved in litigation to discuss allegations in reported 
cases, and (c) ten of the eleven meetings SIC task forces held with the captain of the firm's peer 
review team either to discuss the results of the firm's previous peer review in the light of the alle­
gations, or to review and discuss the scope of an imminent peer review and later the results of 
such review.
The staff furnishes to the Board memoranda prepared by SIC staff for all cases which 
include summaries of the allegations, the accounting and auditing issues involved, their judg­
ments with respect to the significance of the litigation, and the bases for those conclusions. The 
SIC's activities with respect to cases are reviewed at monthly Board meetings to determine 
whether the SIC is properly fulfilling its responsibilities.
Enhancing Credibility of the Process As noted elsewhere in this report, the SEC has in 
its most recent report to Congress once more stated its confidence in the peer review process. 
However, it has been unable to so state with regard to the SIC process.
This inability has stemmed largely from the Commission staff's concern whether the SIC 
has access to sufficient information to permit it to make appropriate judgments, and from the 
staff's conclusion that it did not have access to sufficient information about the activities of the 
Committee to permit the Commission to exercise its oversight role.
These difficulties have their roots in the peculiar sensitivity of the environment in which 
the SIC conducts its activities.
Like all litigants, member firms are extremely reluctant to do anything they think may 
jeopardize their ability to defend against charges made against them. This sensitivity has been 
heightened in recent years as the amounts of settlements and judgments have escalated sharply. 
Consequently, when the SIC was organized it was understood that, as mentioned, the process 
would not eventuate in a judgment concerning the quality or adequacy of the questioned audit. 
Further, the firms were also concerned that if the SIC were given access to the documentation 
related to such an audit for purposes of review, the Committee's personnel who examined the doc­
umentation might be compelled to give testimony concerning their review and any conclusions 
they drew from it, even if their function was not to reach any such conclusion.
Thus, it was initially understood that the SIC would not have access to the workpapers 
associated with an allegedly failed audit. However, neither the Section nor the Board felt that this 
condition unduly inhibited the work of the SIC, since alternative procedures were available to per­
mit the assembly of information from which a sound judgment might be made concerning the 
adequacy of a firm's quality control policies and procedures and its compliance with them as 
related to a complainant's allegations. For instance, SIC task forces have, where appropriate, 
reviewed other audits performed by the personnel associated with the audit in question, audits 
performed by the firm of entities in the same industry as the client for which the allegedly failed 
audit was performed, and audits performed by the same office. Through these and other means, 
the SIC has been able, to the Board's satisfaction, to determine when allegations suggested possible 
quality control problems in the firm.
However, it was perceived that the lack of access to relevant papers associated with the 
questioned audit created an inefficiency in the process, and, moreover, created uncertainty in
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some quarters whether all was indeed being done that could be done to assure the effectivness of 
the SIC's program.
Reevaluation and Subsequent Revision of the Process The Board carefully reviewed 
with its counsel, Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, the problems associated with expanding SIC 
access to documentation associated with an audit involved in litigation. Next, in the summer of 
1986, the Board asked the counsel for the firms represented on the Section's Executive Committee 
to meet to discuss the matter. At that meeting, which was characterized by a professional discus­
sion of outstanding candor, forthrightness, and competence, there emerged the outlines of an 
approach to access which hopefully promote a more efficient and effective SIC process and answer 
the concerns of those who felt there should be greater access.
To deal further with these matters, the Section's Executive Committee appointed the 
Task Force on SIC Methodology. The task force, headed by Mr. Frank Rossi, Vice Chairman of 
Arthur Andersen & Co. and a member of the Executive Committee, included another member of 
the Executive Committee, one former and one current member of the SIC, and two attorneys who 
serve as house counsel to firms represented on the Executive Committee.
After extensive deliberations, all of which were attended by members and staff of the 
Board and which were reviewed carefully and critically at Board meetings, the task force made its 
report to the Executive Committee in April 1987, which approved it and, with a minor change, 
implemented its recommendations.
The recommendations adopted by the Executive Committee were these:
First, a more "structured" procedure was adopted. This approach describes the procedures 
that should be followed in the various stages of inquiry. It also spells out with reasonable precision 
the factors that should be considered in deciding whether to proceed to the next stage—i.e., gen­
eral inquiry, in-depth inquiry, and special review—or to close the file on a case.
Second, the SIC, when it deems it appropriate in connection with its inquiries, is to be 
given access to certain audit documentation, such as audit planning and consultation memoranda 
and summary reviews of audit issues, that might enable the Committee to evaluate whether 
appropriate attention was given by appropriate individuals during the course of the audit to the 
issues addressed by the allegations. There may be instances in which a firm believes providing 
such access may seriously jeopardize its litigation posture. In such cases, the task force must use 
other means, which may include a special review, to satisfy itself concerning the adequacy of the 
firm's quality controls and compliance with them. The Board intends to review closely those 
instances in which requests for access are denied and, if it concludes a refusal is unwarranted or 
seriously impedes the work of the SIC, it will urge upon the Section the adoption of stronger incen­
tives for firms to provide access.
Third, more com­
prehensive and informa­
tive summaries will be 
furnished to the SEC 
when a case is closed. The 
Commission staff has felt 
that the summaries fur­
nished under earlier 
arrangements did not pro­
vide them with the infor­
mation necessary for them 
to carry out their over­
sight function. The new 
summaries will include a 
delineation of the specific 
issues considered (including those identified in any SEC releases relating to the case), the interviews 
conducted, the types of audit documentation reviewed, and the bases for the SIC's conclusions.
Proposed revisions to auditing standards was the subject of discussion among Auditing Stan­
dards Board Chairman ferry Sullivan, AICPA Vice President-Auditing Dan Guy, POB Chairman 
Al Sommer, POB Executive Director Lou Matusiak and POB Vice Chairman Bob Mautz.
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Fourth, the SIC will meet regularly with the Commission staff to discuss SIC policies 
and procedures, concerns the staff may have with actions taken on case files which have been 
closed, and any changes the Commission believes would make the process more effective.
The Board has since the inception of the SIC had full access to the SIC process and has 
been able to satisfy itself that this part of the Section's program has been carried out satisfactorily 
in accordance with the mandate given the SIC. The inability of the SEC to accord it the confidence 
it has accorded the peer review process has been a continuing source of concern to the Board, and 
as a consequence the Board has diligently urged and pursued a course intended to gain the Com­
mission's confidence in the SIC.
The Board is hopeful that as the new procedures are implemented the Commission and 
its staff may gain the level of confidence in the SIC process that the Board has. In its most recent 
published report, the SEC notes that: "The Commission is encouraged by the continuing efforts to 
improve the SIC process."1
Scope of Services 
By CPA Firms
In November 1986, the Board publicly distributed a report prepared by 
a professional research organization entitled, Public Perceptions o f  
M anagement Advisory Services Performed by CPA Firms for Audit 
Clients. While no instance of impaired auditor independence or objectivity related to the rendition 
of management advisory services (MAS) had come to our attention, the Board initiated this 
research study because it is concerned that the continuous expansion of consulting services may 
be perceived as impairing auditor independence and adversely affect the value of the audit function 
over time.
In preparation for the survey, the Board obtained promotional materials, advertisements, 
and other information from firms, and identified the types of services being offered. The survey 
included a sample of such services. The survey responses indicated that key public groups perceive 
that certain types of MAS are likely to impair auditor objectivity and independence. About half or 
more of respondents in each of the key public groups surveyed indicated that the following engage­
ments, when performed for an audit client, could cause a "great deal of" or "some" impairment:
■ Negotiating mergers, acquisitions, and divestitures (76%)
■ Performing actuarial services which directly affect amounts involved on the balance sheet (64%)
■ Implementing a strategic plan (63%)
■ Identifying merger and acquisition candidates (62%)
■ Valuing assets acquired in a business combination (61%)
■ Executive search for senior management personnel (56%)
■ Renegotiations or redetermining price under procurement contracts (50%)
■ Developing a strategic plan (49%)
■ Developing an executive compensation plan (47%)
In response to a survey question, audit committee chairmen indicated that their commit­
tees review MAS engagements performed by their auditors for impairment of auditor indepen­
dence and, for the most part, conduct such review before the services are performed. In that con­
nection, it should be noted that data on MAS fees are required to be reported by member firms to 
the audit committees of SEC registrants and to the Section for its public files. The latter data indi­
cates that almost 80 percent of the SEC registrants audited by SECPS member firms obtain no 
MAS services from their auditor.
The Board published the report without comment and indicated that the results of the 
survey may be useful to the Section as well as to individual firms in deciding what action, if any, 
should be taken to change the perceptions of various groups caused by performance of certain 
types of MAS engagements. The Board believes that the information contained in the Board's 
report will also be useful to firms in developing policies for the rendition of advisory services and 
to companies in making judgments in these instances.
The Board continues to observe with keen interest the continual growth in consulting
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services provided by accounting firms and the effect that such activity has on their operations and 
on the public. A recent article in Forbes magazine epitomizes the Board's concern:
"Happily accounting remains for now at least one of the nation's most admired 
professions, as shown by a recent Louis Harris poll of shareholders and business leaders 
who believed accounting to have the highest moral practices of any major profession—bet­
ter than college professors, lawyers, congressmen, journalists.
Yet if something happens to that credibility, there is more at risk than simply the 
fortunes of the men and women in the green eyeshades. In theory, it is fine if accounting 
firms want to pursue opportunities in related business fields like strategic or financial con­
sulting. There's even a strong contingent of thought that such endeavors will help the firms 
better understand their clients—and as a result do better audits for them. But the stakes 
involved are huge. In the practical world of the marketplace, certified public accountants 
are the only guarantors of financial integrity the capitalist system has. The further the 
industry strays from its roots, the bigger the chance of doing damage to its credibility with 
the public, and that is something from which ultimately no one can profit."2
Other Initiatives Considerable effort has been expended by various entities this past year 
to Improve Quality to enhance audit quality particularly in the development of auditing 
of Audit Practice standards designed to eliminate the insidious practice of "opinion shop­
ping," to close the expectation gap concerning auditor responsibilities, 
and to improve the quality of auditing and expand the role of the auditor.
Minimizing Instances of Opinion Shopping The concept of obtaining a second profes­
sional opinion is generally accepted in certain fields, especially that of medicine. A second opinion 
guards against following the advice of an ultra-conservative or ultra-liberal. In this context, it is 
proper for management to seek a second opinion on the application of generally accepted account­
ing principles in situations where professional literature is not explicit. However, application of 
this concept does not condone continuance of the search until one finds an auditor who will agree 
with management's desired accounting treatment, a practice generally referred to as "opinion 
shopping." The profession has taken several decisive actions to eliminate, or at least minimize, 
this sort of abuse.
During 1986, SECPS mem­
ber firms were required to establish 
policies and procedures for their 
personnel to follow whenever a non­
client requests an opinion on the 
application of an accounting princi­
ple. Such procedures generally 
require consultation with designated 
specialists in the firm and assign­
ment of designated partners to mon­
itor adherence to such policies and 
procedures. Peer reviewers are now 
required to test the firm's compli­
ance with such established policies 
and procedures.
In July 1986, the Auditing Standards Board issued an auditing standard, "Reports on the 
Application of Accounting Principles," which requires all practitioners to follow procedures simi­
lar to those formerly required only of SECPS member firms, including required consultation with 
the "shopper's" accountant to ascertain whether the auditor asked to express an opinion has been 
given all the facts relevant to rendering a professional judgment. The issuance of this standard 
obviated the need for a specific membership requirement; accordingly it was dropped in Decem­
ber. However, the Board is pleased to note that enforcement of the auditing standard will be given
Wally Olson, who as AICPA President played a vital role in the creation of the 
Division for CPA Firms, was invited to discuss with the Board suggestions for 
improving the credibility and effectiveness of the accounting profession’s self- 
regulatory program.
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high priority in SECPS peer reviews.
The Section recently revised its peer review program to require peer reviewers (a) to 
obtain a list of SEC engagements accepted by the firm since the last peer review where, as 
reported in a Form 8-K or similar public filing, the former accountant resigned or there was a 
reported disagreement on an accounting or reporting matter and (b) to ascertain if any opinion on 
the application of generally accepted accounting principles was rendered prior to acceptance of the 
entity as an audit client and, if so, whether such opinion was issued in accordance with the firm's 
procedures. In addition, peer reviewers are required to review current or prior period workpapers to 
the extent necessary to evaluate whether any matters which led to resignation of the predecessor 
auditor or which were the basis for a disagreement were handled appropriately. We believe these 
procedures will minimize the instances of auditors accommodating "opinion shoppers" and will 
enable reviewers to detect situations where the successor auditor accommodated an "opinion 
shopper."
Closing the Expectation Gap There has long been a wide difference of opinion between 
users of audited financial statements regarding an auditor's responsibilities and the auditor's own 
view of what those responsibilities are. The Board believes that significant progress was made this 
past year to close this so-called "expectation gap." The Board commends the Auditing Standards 
Board for its diligent efforts to both improve auditing standards and procedures and more clearly 
define auditors' responsibilities.
In February 1987, the Auditing Standards Board exposed for public comment ten new 
standards which, among other things, are designed to clarify the auditor's responsibility for and 
enhance detection of fraud, improve auditor communications with financial report users and with 
audit committees, and provide early warning about possible financial failure. These proposals offer 
guidance to auditors to improve the effectiveness of audits, a subject which has been a matter of 
concern to both the House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations and the National Com­
mission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting.
Mandatory Peer Reviews While member firms of the SEC Practice Section audit a pre­
dominant majority of the financial statements of public companies (see Appendix D), the Board 
believes the public interest would be best served if all auditors, especially those of public compan­
ies, were required to undergo peer review periodically. The Board has continually expressed the 
hope that this could be accomplished voluntarily throughout the profession. Consequently, the 
Board applauded the actions of the AICPA Board of Directors and Council in recommending that 
the AICPA's bylaws be amended, as the Special Committee on Standards of Professional Conduct 
for Certified Public Accountants had urged. If so amended, the bylaws would have required that a 
member in public practice as a partner, shareholder, or proprietor in a firm auditing one or more 
SEC registrants could retain an individual membership in the AICPA only if the member's firm 
were a member of the SEC Practice Section.
The Board was perplexed and disappointed by the results of the balloting—perplexed that 
only 54 percent of the members cast a ballot on so important an issue (only 130,000 of the esti­
mated 240,000 members voted), and disappointed that the proposal was not favorably voted on by 
the two-to-one margin necessary for a bylaw change (the proposal received a 61 percent favorable 
vote).
The Board will be disappointed if the Institute membership rejects the recommendation 
of the Special Committee on Standards of Professional Conduct for Certified Public Accountants 
(the "Anderson Committee") that would require, as a condition for AICPA membership, participa­
tion by the member's firm in the Institute's quality review program. If adopted, firms joining the 
quality review program would be required to undergo an independent review of their quality con­
trol policies and procedures and compliance therewith every three years.
The Board believes peer review is the most effective means available to a profession to 
improve and maintain the quality of service its members provide. Our extensive involvement with 
the peer review program of the SEC Practice Section has convinced us that it works and works 
well. Therefore, we are gratified by the actions of the National Commission on Fraudulent Finan­
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cial Reporting3 and the SEC4 in endorsing the objective that all public accounting firms that audit 
public companies should belong to a professional organization that requires periodic peer reviews.
The Board urges, however, that any implementation of a mandatory peer review program 
be accomplished within a self-regulatory framework. We see no need for the SEC to require a rigid 
or very structured relationship with a peer review organization since the SEC has found its current 
access to the Section's peer review process sufficient for it to form its own independent judgment 
regarding its effectiveness.s The Board has expressed these views to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission. A copy of our comment letter to the SEC on its proposal is reproduced as Exhibit I.
National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting Private sector concerns about 
incidences of fraudulent financial reporting resulted in appointment of an independent commis­
sion to study the causes of fraudulent financial reporting and recommend steps to reduce its inci­
dence. In April 1987, the Commission, known as the National Commission on Fraudulent Finan­
cial Reporting, under the capable chairmanship of former SEC Commissioner James C. Treadway, 
Jr., published a report for public comment which contains a series of proposed recommendations 
to curb such practice. We applaud the Commission's diligent and practical consideration of the 
complex issues of fraudulent financial reporting and generally support its recommendations.
We have provided written comments to the Commission on those recommendations that 
directly or indirectly bear on the accounting profession's self-regulatory program:
■ Improving audit quality
■ Concurring partner review
■ Peer review
■ Regulation of the public accounting profession
■ Role of an audit committee vis-a-vis management advisory services by auditors
Our views on these matters are expressed in various sections of this report. A copy of our com­
ment letter is reproduced as Exhibit II.
The Board is hopeful and optimistic that the proposals of the National Commission and 
the Auditing Standards Board will be adopted, especially those that are designed to prevent audi­
tors from accommodating "opinion shoppers" and those that will reduce the differences between 
the responsibilities the accounting profession believes an auditor should have and the responsibili­
ties that users of audited financial statements believe auditors should have.
The Board is also hopeful that the number of firms that subject their quality control sys­
tems to peer review will continue to increase. Accordingly, as indicated, we support the manda­
tory quality review recommendations of the Anderson Committee and the objective of the SEC's 
proposal regarding mandatory peer review.
Conclusions We believe the matters discussed in this report offer convincing evi­
dence that peer regulation is effective. The Section deserves much 
credit for the effective mechanisms it has put in place to test and moni­
tor the professional accounting and auditing practices of member firms who must deal with and 
help solve the myriad of complex problems created by the dynamic business world. As we have 
said in the past, peer regulation is working and working well to maintain and improve the quality 
of audit practice of firms that participate in this voluntary peer review program.
FOOTNOTES
1. U. S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Fifty-Second Annual Report, 1986, p. 26.
2. Greene, Richard, "Blood on the Ledger," Forbes, May 18, 1987.
3. Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting, Exposure Draft, April 1987.
4. Release 6695, Securities and Exchange Commission, April 1987.
5. "The Commission believes the peer review process contributes significantly to improving the quality control systems of member firms and thus 
should enhance the consistency and quality of practice before the Commission." U. S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Fifty-Second Annual 
Report, 1986, p. 25.
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Exhibit I
POB Comment Letter on SEC Proposal for Mandatory Peer Reviews
The Public Oversight Board is pleased to com­
ment on the Commission's proposed amendments 
to its rules that would require that financial state­
ments included in filings with the Commission be 
certified by an independent accountant who has 
undergone a peer review of his/her accounting and 
auditing practice within the last three years.
Since its inception in 1978, our Board has had the 
unique opportunity of assessing the effects and 
effectiveness of the peer review process by virtue of 
monitoring the self-regulatory program of the SEC 
Practice Section of the American Institute of Certi­
fied Public Accountants. We have, in each of our 
eight annual reports, unequivocally stated that the 
peer review process has improved the quality of 
audit practice of the Section's member firms.
Peer review is the most effective means available 
to a profession to improve and maintain the quality 
of service that its members provide. Our extensive 
involvement with the program of the SEC Practice 
Section has convinced us that it works and works 
well at reasonable cost. SECPS member firms of all 
sizes, from the largest to the smallest, have con­
cluded that peer review has a positive cost/benefit 
relationship and have heartily endorsed the program.
Thus, our Board strongly believes that the public 
interest would be best served if all auditors, espe­
cially those of public companies, were required to 
undergo peer review periodically and to make the 
improvements in their quality control systems that 
a qualified peer reviewer considered necessary for 
the firm to have reasonable assurance of complying 
with professional standards in performing account­
ing and auditing engagements. We have consistently 
urged members of the profession to make this com­
mitment voluntarily. We had hoped that the recent 
proposal of the AICPA Board of Directors and Coun­
cil would be adopted, which for practical purposes 
would have caused virtually all firms with public 
clients to join the SEC Practice Section and thus 
would have helped accomplish this goal. Although 
the proposal received a 61-percent favorable vote, we 
were disappointed that it did not obtain the two- 
thirds margin necessary for adoption.
Our Board unequivocally endorses the objective 
of the Commission's mandatory peer review pro­
posal, namely, "to enhance the quality of audits of 
Commission registrants." However, we are con­
cerned that the SECPS program, which has 
functioned exceedingly well as an initiative of the 
profession subject to oversight by our Board and 
your staff, might be less effective if some of the rigid 
rules in the proposal were adopted and literally 
enforced.
Our major concerns relate to:
■ The role of the SEC
■ The need for confidentiality
■ The setting of peer review standards
■ The review of contested audits
The Role of the SEC
The public accounting profession is effectively 
regulated at three distinct levels—by firms, by the 
profession, and by government. While the objective 
of each level is to assure reliable financial reporting, 
each achieves its objective in a different way.
While we applaud the objective of the SEC's cur­
rent proposal, we believe the proposal should be re­
vised so that it will not materially alter the present 
relationship between the accounting profession's 
peer regulators and government regulators, a rela­
tionship which has in the past decade developed and 
matured, we believe, in a manner satisfactory to 
everyone involved.
We therefore urge the Commission to make clear 
that the Commission's relationship to a qualifying 
peer review organization (PRO) will be to test the 
effectiveness of the PRO's system of peer review, 
including the role of its oversight body. Thus, each 
PRO should be allowed the same degree of auton­
omy that the SEC Practice Section now enjoys. Ex­
perience with the SEC Practice Section's program 
shows that the SEC does not need to have access to 
all peer reviews administered by the PRO or to the 
complete set of workpapers prepared by peer review­
ers, as the proposal suggests. The Commission has 
been able to satisfy itself as to the effectiveness of 
the SECPS's peer review program by inspecting 
selected workpapers of fewer than 25 percent of the 
reviews performed in recent years. Indeed, the SEC's 
discussion of the proposed rules acknowledges that 
"the private sector approach currently embodied in 
the SECPS and POB structure has proved both effec­
tive and efficient."
The background section of the proposal states: 
"fust as the Commission's previous conclusions 
concerning the efficacy of the SECPS's program 
have been reached without the review of all peer 
review workpapers, it would usually not be neces­
sary for the Commission to review all peer review 
workpapers to judge the efficacy of a PRO's program 
or its compliance with the Commission's require­
ments." The proposed rules, however, establish the 
Commission's right to access all peer review 
workpapers but fail to support why that ever would 
be necessary for the SEC to satisfy itself that the 
program of a PRO is functioning properly.
The Board urges the Commission to extend to all 
PROs the principle of testing the system that has
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worked so well with its oversight of the peer review 
program of the SECPS. Moreover, rather than the 
rigid structure proposed in the rules, the Board sug­
gests that the Commission enter into a memoran­
dum of understanding with each qualifying PRO, 
which should be available for public scrutiny, with 
provisions similar to those included in the October 
15, 1982 Memorandum of Understanding among the 
SEC, SECPS, and the POB. Such a document should 
contain provisions similar to those in that memo­
randum, such as:
■ Establishment of the SEC's right to inspect 
selected peer review workpapers of firms auditing 
SEC registrants and the workpapers of the over­
sight body.
■ Formalization of the timing of availability of 
workpapers and reports.
■ Provision for confidentiality of certain data, such 
as names of SEC registrants, personnel and offices 
of reviewed firms, etc.
The Board agrees that a PRO should report imme­
diately to the Office of the Chief Accountant when­
ever a reviewed firm has a material quality control 
deficiency and refuses to take corrective action. 
Based on our oversight of the SECPS peer review 
program, we are confident that this will rarely, if 
ever, be necessary. Over the ten years during which 
the AICPA program has been in existence, only one 
firm refused to take the corrective action considered 
necessary by the Section for the firm to have reason­
able assurance of complying with professional stan­
dards when performing accounting and auditing 
engagements; that firm was expelled. However, 
should such a situation eventuate in the future, the 
Board believes that denial of the right of that auditor 
to certify financial statements filed with the Com­
mission would be appropriate.
The Board believes the SEC's relationship with 
the program of the SEC Practice Section is consis­
tent with the notion of self-regulation which the 
SEC has publicly supported. Moreover, such an 
approach is the only one that is likely to assure the 
high degree of voluntary cooperation of firms that 
the Board believes is essential for the operation of an 
effective peer review program by a PRO.
The Need for Confidentiality 
We believe one of the major reasons that the peer 
review and special review programs of the SECPS 
are effective is because they have evolved into pro­
grams that strike a proper balance between protec­
tion of the public and the rights and obligations of 
the member firms. The confidential relationship 
auditors have with their clients is essential for an 
effective audit process; such a relationship is also 
essential for an effective peer review process. The 
SECPS's peer review process works well because it 
protects this confidentiality. Peer review workpapers 
made available to the staff of the Office of the Chief 
Accountant do not identify SEC registrants (or even 
the nonpublic clients), offices of multi-office firms, 
individuals within firms except by title or position,
or firms that audit fewer than ten SEC registrants. If 
these features are not retained, we sincerely believe 
the peer review process would be considerably less 
effective; the reviewed firms would be less candid 
in responding to questions posed by the peer review­
ers, and peer reviewers would be less inclined to 
document detailed findings in peer review work- 
papers. Both these elements are essential for effec­
tive monitoring of the program by the PRO's peer 
review committee, its oversight board, and the staff 
of the SEC.
The Setting of Peer Review Standards
If the proposal is adopted in its present form, the 
SEC would establish peer review standards that 
PROs would be expected to follow. However, we 
believe that the Commission should look to the 
private sector to establish quality control and peer 
review standards, in much the same way as the 
Commission looks to the private sector to establish 
accounting and auditing standards. Moreover, a 
relatively high degree of flexibility is needed if rules 
are to be promptly adapted to a changing environ­
ment; such flexibility is more easily attainable if 
standards are set by a PRO than through the rule- 
making procedures of the Commission.
The standards for performing and reporting the 
results of peer reviews are not static. The standards 
of the SECPS have been repeatedly revised as expe­
rience has indicated the need for or the possibility 
of improvement. At times, standards were revised 
solely at the initiative of the Section, at other times 
at the urging of the Board or the SEC.
The setting of standards or rules by the SEC 
would materially alter the environment and stifle 
the profession's initiative to make changes. There­
fore, we urge the Commission not to publish peer 
review rules, but instead (a) to publish guidance for 
a PRO to follow in setting standards it expects its 
reviewers and members to follow, and (b) to require 
a PRO in order to be recognized as a qualifying PRO 
to establish and enforce peer review standards that 
are acceptable to the Commission.
If the SEC adopts rules as proposed, the Commis­
sion would have line responsibility and control over 
each PRO and its board. We do not believe that this 
would be in the best interests of the profession, the 
public, or the SEC. We do not believe that appoint­
ments of members of a PRO's oversight board 
should require SEC's concurrence. If this were done, 
the board would not be perceived as independent 
but rather would be seen as an arm of the Commis­
sion. Such a perception could adversely affect the 
working relationships that a board needs to perform 
its oversight role effectively. Such a change would be 
in sharp contrast to the efficient and effectively 
operative self-regulatory process that the Commis­
sion has found to be wholly satisfactory over the 
years in dealing with the SEC Practice Section and 
our Board.
We strongly believe a board should be truly indepen­
dent with respect to both the profession and the Com­
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mission if it is to be effective and have credibility. 
T he R ev iew  o f  C on tested  Audits 
A peer reviewer is charged with the responsibility 
of reviewing each engagement selected for review in 
sufficient depth to be able to conclude whether the 
engagement was or was not performed in all mate­
rial respects in accordance with professional stan­
dards. In addition, largely at our urging, peer review 
teams of the SEC Practice Section are required to 
consider all litigation, proceedings, or investigations 
involving SEC registrants initiated since the firm's 
prior peer review in setting the scope of that firm's 
peer review—in deciding which offices, audit areas, 
clients in specified industries, and engagement per­
sonnel are to be subjected to review.
However, while we believe it is entirely appropri­
ate that peer review teams judge each engagement 
reviewed as to whether it was performed in accord­
ance with professional standards, we believe it is 
inappropriate to require such judgment to be made 
concerning the performance of an audit that is being 
litigated. The judicial process, which has access to 
all relevant facts through its subpoena powers and 
safeguards the rights of both plaintiff and defendant, 
is the only appropriate forum where contested audits 
should be resolved. Consequently, we believe that 
the right of a firm to deny full access to contested 
audits, to either a peer reviewer or a special investi­
gator outside the judicial process, is reasonable in 
the light of the insurance crisis, the litigious cli­
mate, the high cost in terms of time and money in 
defending oneself in a court trial or government 
proceeding, and the magnitude of monetary dam­
ages against auditors awarded by some judges and 
juries.
Nevertheless, our Board believes that a PRO 
should have a program to deal with the quality con­
trol implications of contested audits. We believe 
that this should be a separate supplemental program 
and not an integral part of the peer review program. 
The consideration of contested audits by a PRO in a 
special investigative process rather than the peer 
review process has several advantages:
■ Quality control deficiencies that may be inferred 
from allegations of contested audits would receive 
immediate attention rather than be deferred until 
that firm's next peer review, which could in some 
cases be in excess of two years later.
■ A standing committee of highly experienced prac­
titioners is more likely to be objective in evaluat­
ing the quality control implications of the allega­
tions made in litigation than a review team that 
may have previously opined on the quality con­
trols of the firm.
■ A standing committee that reviews all contested 
audits of all member firms belonging to a PRO is 
better able to assess whether professional stand­
ards should be reevaluated or whether professional 
guidance in the application of standards is ade­
quate.
The objective of the special review program of a 
PRO should not be to determine whether a con­
tested audit has or has not been performed in 
accordance with professional standards. Conse­
quently, we believe that those charged with the 
responsibility for the special investigative program 
should not and need not have access to the full set 
of workpapers of contested audits. We support the 
concept that "special investigators," when appro­
priate, should be expected to request and be given 
access to documentation that will permit them to 
make a judgment quickly and efficiently as to 
whether a firm's quality control system is appropri­
ately designed and is being complied with.
We recognize, however, that in rare cases, where 
the potential monetary damages are relatively large, 
a firm may not want to risk granting access to even 
a portion of the workpapers prepared during the 
course of performing a contested audit. In such 
cases, it is expected that refusal by a firm to grant 
access to the requested documentation will materi­
ally increase the likelihood that the special investi­
gators may need to order a special review in order to 
gain the requisite assurance that the firm's quality 
control system provides it with reasonable assurance 
of complying with professional standards in the 
performance of future engagements.
The Board believes that the four-phased approach 
for the operation of the special investigative or 
review process recently recommended by the SECPS 
Task Force on SIC Methodology and adopted in 
April 1987 by the Section is an appropriate model 
for the special review process of a PRO. We recom­
mend that the SEC require each qualifying PRO to 
have a similar process.
In conclusion, we strongly favor mandatory peer 
review for an auditor of an SEC registrant rather 
than proxy statement disclosure by the registrant as 
to whether its auditor has subjected his/her quality 
control system to peer review. Should the Commis­
sion decide not to require auditors of SEC registrants 
to belong to a PRO acceptable to the Commission, the 
Board would support such a disclosure requirement.
We shall be pleased to meet with the Commission 
to clarify any of the matters discussed in this letter.
June 29, 1987
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Exhibit II
POB Comment Letter on Draft Report of National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting
The Public Oversight Board is pleased to com­
ment on the Commission's draft report entitled 
Report o f  the N ational C om m ission  on Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting. While our paramount responsi­
bility is to oversee the voluntary self-regulatory 
programs of the SEC Practice Section of the AICPA, 
we have a keen interest in all initiatives to improve 
the quality of audit practice and financial reporting.
We applaud the Commission's diligent and prac­
tical consideration of the complex issues of fraudu­
lent financial reporting. We generally support all of 
the Commission's recommendations and appreciate 
the fact that the report incorporates the views we 
expressed in our meeting with the Commission.
From its inception in 1978, the Board has had a 
unique opportunity to assess the effects of the self- 
regulatory programs of the SEC Practice Section on 
quality of audit practice. While the individual mem­
bers of the Board may wish to submit personal com­
ments on other aspects of the draft report, this com­
mentary will be limited to those aspects of the 
report that directly or indirectly bear on the 
accounting profession's self-regulatory program:
■ Improving Audit Quality
■ Concurring Partner Review
■ Peer Review
■ Regulation of the Public Accounting Profession
■ Role of the Audit Committee vis-a-vis 
Management Advisory Services by Auditors
Improving Audit Quality
Our Board agrees that elimination of fraudulent 
financial reporting requires concerted action of all 
parties involved in the financial reporting process 
and that the roles of the reporting entity and the 
audit committee are crucial. The auditing profession 
also has an important role to play, and, in our view, 
has not thus far accepted the degree of responsibility 
that it should have for requiring that the scope of an 
audit be expanded to detect instances of fraudulent 
financial reporting not accompanied by collusive 
acts of management and/or employees.
We are pleased to note the profession's current 
initiatives in this regard. Adoption of the revisions 
to auditing standards currently being proposed by 
the Auditing Standards Board will require auditors 
to expand the scope of the audit to increase the 
likelihood of detecting major errors and irregulari­
ties and to evaluate the effectiveness of the client's 
internal controls.
Concurring Partner Review
The Board believes that review of an audit engage­
ment by a partner in addition to the engagement 
partner can provide a firm with significant addi­
tional assurance that its engagements are performed 
in all material respects in accordance with profes­
sional standards. It should be noted, however, that 
concurring partner review is now required only for 
audits of SEC registrants performed by firms that 
are members of the SEC Practice Section. Neither 
generally accepted auditing standards nor quality 
control standards require that audits be subjected to 
concurring partner review. Moreover, the concurring 
partner review membership requirement has only 
recently been strengthened by the SEC Practice 
Section—in large part at our urging—to require 
that certain workpapers as well as the audit report 
and financial statements be subjected to review by 
the second partner. The effectiveness of the imple­
mentation of the expanded requirement will be first 
tested in peer reviews conducted in 1987.
A meeting in May 1987 with representatives of 
the Section's Peer Review and Special Investigations 
Committees disclosed differences among CPA firms 
as to additional assurance that a concurring partner 
review can and should provide and the responsibil­
ity that the concurring reviewer is or should be 
assigned. We were advised that such differences 
exist even among the large national firms and that 
very few firms charge a concurring reviewer with 
the responsibility for doing a sufficiently compre­
hensive review so as to provide the firm with addi­
tional assurance that the audit was conducted in a 
manner that would reasonably ensure detection of 
fraudulent financial reporting.
The Board is concerned about the differences that 
exist regarding the degree of assurance that a con­
curring partner review should provide. We are 
aware, however, of the difficulty of specifying proce­
dures that all firms should require of their concur­
ring review partners in view of the widely varying 
methods firms use in documenting the results of 
auditing procedures performed.
The Board believes the Commission's recommen­
dations regarding concurring review have merit and 
should be required to be applied by all auditing 
firms, at minimum to audits of clients of public 
companies or of clients in high-risk industries. The 
Commission might well consider recommending 
that the Auditing Standards Board incorporate con­
curring partner review as part of quality control 
standards or, at minimum, issue guidance as to 
when an audit engagement should be subjected to 
concurring review.
Peer Review
Peer review, the keystone of the accounting pro­
fession's self-regulatory program, has undeniably 
improved the quality of audit practice and is the 
most effective means available to the accounting 
profession to improve the quality of service that its 
members provide.
The Section has revised its peer review program
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whenever experience indicated the need for or a 
possibility of improvement. One such recent revi­
sion will cause reviewers to (a) obtain a list of SEC 
engagements accepted since the last peer review 
where, as reported in a Form 8-K or similar public 
filing, the former auditor resigned or there was a 
disagreement on a reporting matter between man­
agement and the auditor, and (b) ascertain whether 
the firm rendered an opinion on the application of 
generally accepted accounting principles prior to 
accepting the registrant as an audit client and, if so, 
whether such opinion was issued in accordance 
with the firm's procedures.
In addition, peer reviewers are required to review 
current and prior period workpapers to the extent 
necessary to evaluate whether any matters which 
led to resignation of the predecessor auditor or 
which were the subject of disagreement between 
the predecessor auditor and management were han­
dled appropriately by the successor auditor. We 
believe these procedures will be effective in detect­
ing situations where the successor auditor accom­
modated "an opinion shopper." We are satisfied that 
compliance with the recently adopted auditing 
standard regarding opinion shopping can be ade­
quately tested in the peer review process. Therefore, 
we do not consider it necessary that peer reviewers 
be required to review all new client engagements. 
Regulation of the Public Accounting Profession
Our Board strongly believes that the public inter­
est would be best served if all auditors, especially 
those of public companies, were required to undergo 
peer review periodically and to make those improve­
ments in their quality control systems considered 
necessary to provide reasonable assurance of com­
plying with professional standards in performing 
accounting and auditing engagements. Accordingly, 
we endorse the current proposal of the Securities 
and Exchange Commission that each registrant's 
financial statements be audited by an auditor that 
belongs to a peer review organization acceptable to 
the SEC. Our Board supports denial of an auditor's 
right to certify financial statements filed with the 
Commission if his/her firm has a material quality 
control deficiency and refuses to take corrective 
action.
However, we are concerned that the peer review 
program of the SEC Practice Section, which has 
functioned exceedingly well as an initiative of the 
profession and is subject to effective oversight by 
our Board and the SEC, might be less effective if the 
rigid rules in the SEC's proposal where adopted and 
strictly enforced. Our Board believes the SEC's 
present relationship with the SEC Practice Section 
is consistent with the notion of self-regulation 
which your Commission embraces and the SEC has 
publicly supported. Moreover, the present approach 
will continue to assure the high degree of coopera­
tion by firms that the Board believes is essential for 
the operation of an effective peer review program. 
The SEC should not have the right to exercise line
authority over any peer review organization; its role 
should be one of active oversight. As your Commis­
sion recommends, we fully agree that " ... the SEC 
should continue to monitor and maintain liaisons 
with the public accounting profession's quality 
assurance program."
We have expressed these views to the Securities 
and Exchange Commission. A copy of our letter to 
the Commission is attached for your consideration. 
Role of the Audit Committee Vis-a-vis 
Management Advisory Services by Auditors
In November 1986, our Board published results of 
a survey it authorized a professional research organi­
zation to conduct entitled, Public Perceptions o f  
M anagem ent A dvisory Services Perform ed by CPA 
Firms for Audit Clients. While no instance of 
impaired auditor independence or objectivity attrib­
utable to the rendition of advisory services has ever 
come to our attention, the Board authorized the 
research study because it is concerned that the con­
tinuous expansion of consulting services by CPA 
firms may be perceived as impairing auditor inde­
pendence and thus could adversely affect the value 
of the audit function over time.
The survey indicated that key public groups per­
ceive certain types of MAS as impairing auditor 
objectivity and independence. In distributing the 
research report, the Board noted that the survey was 
not authorized or intended to be used as a basis for 
POB action. It was intended to be used by the profes­
sion to decide what action, if any, the profession 
should take to change the perceptions of various 
groups which either use audited financial state­
ments or have a high interest and concern with 
them. The Board is pleased to note that the SEC 
Practice Section has formed a task force to consider 
the implications of the perceptions reported in the 
Board's survey.
We also intend to suggest in our upcoming annual 
report that the information contained in the 
research report be used by firms in developing poli­
cies for the rendition of advisory services and to 
companies in dealing with these matters. In that 
regard, we support the Commission's recommenda­
tion that an audit committee should adopt a policy 
of reviewing management's evaluation of factors 
related to the independence of the company's audi­
tor and approving in advance the types and extent of 
management advisory services that management 
plans to engage the company's auditing firm to 
perform.
Our Board commends the Commission for its thor­
ough investigation of the nature and causes of fraud­
ulent financial reporting and its meaningful recom­
mendations for eliminating, or at minimum 
significantly reducing, the incidence of fraudulent 
financial reporting. We shall be pleased to meet 
with the Commission to clarify any of the matters 
discussed in this letter.
June 30, 1987
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Appendix A
Peer Review 
Activities
The quality of services of a CPA firm is dependent 
in large part on its system of quality control. In 
1979, the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants issued quality control standards applic­
able to the conduct of an accounting and auditing 
practice. Each firm that is a member of the Division 
for CPA Firms is required to establish quality con­
trol policies and procedures that provide the firm 
with reasonable assurance that its accounting and 
auditing engagements will be performed in accor­
dance with professional standards—i.e., generally 
accepted accounting principles and generally 
accepted auditing standards.
While generally accepted auditing standards 
relate to the conduct of individual audit engage­
ments, quality control standards relate to the con­
duct of a firm's audit practice as a whole. A system 
of quality control for a CPA firm consists of nine 
elements: independence, acceptance and continu­
ance of clients, hiring, assignment of personnel to 
engagements, supervision, consultation, profes­
sional development, advancement, and inspection.
Peer review—the cornerstone of the accounting 
profession's self-regulatory program—is the process 
by which the design of and compliance with a CPA 
firm's quality control system for its accounting and 
auditing practice is examined, evaluated, and pub­
licly reported on, by a team of qualified, experi­
enced, and independent CPAs from one or more 
other firms. Firms that are members of the Division 
for CPA Firms must undergo a peer review of their 
accounting and auditing practice at least once every 
three years.1 This discussion, however, is limited to 
the peer review program of the SEC Practice Section.
A peer review consists of the following:
■ An evaluation of the appropriateness of the design 
of the firm's quality control system in the light of 
the firm's accounting and auditing practice.
■ A variety of tests for compliance by its personnel 
with the firm's quality control policies and proce­
dures at each organizational or functional level 
within the firm.
■ Review of a representative sample of accounting 
and audit engagements, including audit and 
other reports, financial statements, and relevant 
workpaper files to ascertain whether they were 
performed or prepared in conformity with 
professional standards and the firm's policies and 
procedures.
■ Tests for compliance with other membership 
requirements of the Section, some of which are 
mandatory quality control policies and procedures 
above and beyond current professional standards.
■ Expression of a written opinion on the design of 
the firm's quality control system and the level of 
compliance by the firm's personnel with its qual­
ity control policies and procedures and the Sec­
tion's membership requirements.
The Section has developed and published stan­
dards and extensive guidance to assist review teams 
in conducting and reporting on peer reviews.
1986 Reviews
In 1986, 127 SECPS member firms had their qual­
ity control systems peer reviewed— 14 for the first 
time, 18 for the second time, 93 for the third time, 
and 2 for the fourth time.
Six of these were "accelerated reviews"—i.e., 
reviews the Peer Review Committee required the 
firms to undergo prior to the expiration of the nor­
mal three-year cycle because their prior review had 
disclosed significant quality control deficiencies 
requiring extensive corrective actions. All six firms 
had previously received modified reports. Four of 
the firms received unqualified reports on their 1986 
reviews. Two firms received another modified report 
because their quality control systems still needed 
significant improvement.
As of June 30, 1987, the Peer Review Committee 
had accepted 111 reports on member firms' 1986 
peer reviews. Acceptance of reports on the remain­
ing 16 reviews had been deferred pending resolution 
of various significant matters.
Types of Reports Issued 
After performing its review of the firm's quality 
control system and testing compliance by firm per­
sonnel with that system and with the Section's 
membership requirements, a peer review team sum­
marizes its findings and conclusions in a formal 
report, usually accompanied by a letter of com­
ments. The review team may express an unquali­
fied, qualified, or adverse opinion on the reviewed 
firm's quality control system. Strict adherence to 
the reporting standards delineated in the SECPS 
Manual is enforced by the Section's Peer Review 
Committee.
In 1986, 115 or 91% of the firms reviewed 
received unqualified opinions, 105 of which were 
accompanied by letters of comments. Twelve firms, 
or 9%, received qualified reports and letters of com­
ments. Reports on reviews completed in 1986 are 
classified by type of report accepted by the Peer 
Review Committee or, for the 16 reports not yet 
processed by the Committee, based on a preliminary 
evaluation made by the Committee's and POB's 
staffs of the peer review teams' findings. Since 
inception of the program, about 950 SECPS peer 
reviews have been performed; 88% of the reports 
issued have been unqualified, 10% qualified, and 
2% adverse.
While improvement in the quality of accounting 
and auditing of member firms cannot be precisely 
measured, it is clear that improvement is occurring. 
See discussion of "Improvements in Quality of Prac­
tice" on page 12 of the Board's report.
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The Committee and its staff continue to enforce 
peer review standards vigorously and equitably 
often not accepting the review team's report as origi­
nally submitted. In 1986, the Committee initially 
rejected 19 reports— 15% of the total. The primary 
reasons for rejection were:
■ The report and/or letter of comments issued were 
not appropriate in light of the deficiencies noted 
during the review; in these cases, the review 
teams were required to change the report and/or 
letter of comments.
■ The review team did not test a representative or 
sufficient number of accounting and auditing 
engagements; in these cases, review teams were 
required to return to the firm and review addi­
tional engagements.
■ Major disagreements between the review team 
and reviewed firm had not been resolved; in these 
cases, a Committee member was appointed to 
review the findings, discuss the matter with both 
parties, and recommend a course of action to the 
Committee. In each case, the matter was ulti­
mately resolved to the satisfaction of all parties.
statements to be corrected in subsequent year by 
restating the prior year, (c) perform the additional 
audit procedures considered necessary by generally 
accepted auditing standards, or (d) eliminate cause 
of impairment of independence.
If the firm does not concur with the review team's 
opinion that the engagement is substandard, the 
matter is reported immediately to the Committee 
for resolution. If the firm and the Committee cannot 
resolve the matter to their mutual satisfaction, the 
firm is required to report the matter to the Profes­
sional Ethics Division for resolution and to advise 
the Committee of the actions taken as a result 
thereof.
The number of engagements evaluated by review 
teams as substandard has decreased in each of the 
past three years, another indication that the process 
is improving the quality of practice of the member 
firms. Details are shown in the accompanying table.
During 1986, review teams reviewed the reports, 
financial statements, and supporting workpapers of 
1,285 audit engagements, 327 of which were audits 
of SEC registrants. Review teams found 12 engage-
Audit Engagements Evaluated as Substandard by Peer R eview  Teams
Peer Review Year
1983 1984 1985 1986
N um ber of Firm s R e v ie w e d ........................................... 144 167 80 127
N um ber of Audit Engagem ents Reviewed ........... 1315 1162 6 5 7 1285
N um ber of Engagem ents Evaluated as 
Substandard ........................................................................ 3 3 19 5 12
Percent of Audit Engagem ents Reviewed and 
Evaluated as Substandard ........................................... 2 .5 % 1.6% 0 .8 % 0 .9 %
N um ber of Firm s Perform ing Engagem ents  
Considered Substandard ............................................. 16 10 4 10
Substandard Performance on Individual 
Engagements
Peer review teams assess the workpaper evidence 
for each engagement reviewed to ascertain whether 
the engagement was performed in conformity with 
professional standards. An engagement is considered 
substandard when, in the opinion of the review 
team, the financial statements were incorrectly 
reported to be in conformity with generally 
accepted accounting principles in all material 
respects, or when the auditing firm had not per­
formed sufficient procedures to support the opinion 
it expressed.
Each substandard engagement discovered in the 
course of a review is required to be reported to an 
appropriate authority within the reviewed firm and 
addressed by the firm immediately.
If the firm agrees with the review team's conclu­
sion, it is required to (a) withdraw its opinion if the 
financial statements are considered not to have 
been prepared in accordance with generally 
accepted accounting principles, (b) cause financial
ments, or 0.9% of the number reviewed, that they 
considered to be substandard in the application of 
generally accepted accounting principles or gener­
ally accepted auditing standards; 4 were audits of 
SEC registrants.
Monitoring of Corrective Actions Required of 
Firms Reviewed in 1986 
Representatives of two member firms were re­
quired to meet with the Committee to discuss the 
quality control deficiencies noted in their peer re­
views and to report on the corrective actions they 
had initiated. In each case, the Committee im­
pressed upon the firm representatives, who were 
either members of top management or had responsi­
bility for the firm's quality control system, the need 
for strong and timely implementation of corrective 
action plans. In addition, one firm voluntarily met 
with the Committee to report the changes it had 
made to its quality control policies and procedures 
and the results obtained therefrom. The Committee 
is actively monitoring the results of the corrective 
actions of each of these firms.
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Corrective Actions Required with Respect to 
Substandard Engagements Identified in Peer 
Reviews Performed in 1986
SEC Non-SEC
Engagements Engagements
Audit report recalled and 
financial statements/audit 
report revised and reissued . . .  0 3
Financial statements corrected 
in subsequent year by restating
the prior year ..............................  0 3
Omitted auditing procedures
performed.....................................  2 2
Cause of impairment of
independence eliminated.........  2 0
In each instance where significant quality control 
deficiencies were detected during the peer review, 
including some not serious enough to call for a 
modified report, the Committee required the 
reviewed firm to provide assurance that an 
appropriate corrective action plan had been 
effectively implemented. Such assurance was 
required of 21 of the 111 firms reviewed in 1986 
whose reports have been accepted by the 
Committee.
Assurance was requested in various forms, such 
as requiring a firm to:
■ Undergo a full scope peer review within one year.
■ Permit the team captain to evaluate revisions of 
the quality control system to test compliance 
with the revised policies and procedures to assess 
the effectiveness of corrective actions.
■ Submit copies of the inspection report for the 
following year.
■ Permit the team captain to review the planned 
scope of the firm's next inspection and monitor 
its performance.
■ Permit the team captain to review major revisions 
to the firm's quality control document and report 
the results of such review to the Committee.
■ Develop and submit copy of detailed corrective 
action plan and submit quarterly reports to the 
Committee on the status of the implementation 
of the plan.
Monitoring of Corrective Actions Required of 
Firms Reviewed in 1985
At June 30, 1986, the reports on reviews 
performed in 1985 of five firms had not been 
accepted by the Committee, pending satisfactory 
resolution of certain matters by the reviewed firms. 
All five reports have since been accepted by the 
Committee. The Committee required those firms 
with serious quality control deficiencies to provide 
assurance that the causes of the deficiencies had 
been corrected. Assurance measures included:
■ Requiring one firm:
□ to submit to a full scope peer review in 1987,
□ to continue to employ consultants to perform 
preissuance reviews of the financial statements, 
audit reports, and supporting workpapers on all 
audit engagements,
□ to employ consultants to design and make operative 
an appropriate quality control system, and
□ to submit its internal inspection reports for 
evaluation by the Committee.
■ Requiring one firm:
□ to have its peer review team test and report on the 
effectiveness of selected revised quality control 
policies and procedures, and
□ to submit its internal inspection reports for 
evaluation by the Committee.
■ Requiring one firm to submit its internal
inspection reports for evaluation by the
Committee.
Every member firm made or agreed to make the 
changes in its quality control system deemed neces­
sary by the review team (and/or by the Committee) 
and none refused to provide the information the 
Committee requested evidencing that appropriate 
and effective corrective actions had been taken. 
Both small and large firms have had to provide the 
Committee with such evidence. At June 30, 1987, 
the Committee continued to monitor the effective­
ness of revisions to the quality control systems of 
firms in the following size ranges:
Number of Number
Professionals of Firms
1- 10 9
11- 100 12
Over 100 5
Modification of Peer Review Standards and 
Procedures
Peer review standards are revised whenever 
experience suggests they can be made more effec­
tive or efficient or whenever additional member­
ship requirements are enacted. During the past 
year, as reported on page 20 of the Board's report, 
standards were adopted to address concerns about 
"opinion shopping."
Additionally, the Committee adopted as a peer 
review standard a procedure that had been infor­
mally applied in prior years. Upon identification of a 
substandard engagement during the course of a peer 
review, the review team must now consider the 
advisability of extending the scope of the review to 
other engagements to determine if the substandard 
work is indicative of a pattern of performance or an 
aberration. The additional procedures could include 
the review of additional engagements supervised by 
the same partner, other engagements in the same 
industry, or engagements with characteristics simi­
lar to those present in the substandard engagement.
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In 1986, the Peer Review Committees of both 
sections revised the standards for performing and 
reporting peer reviews, significantly revised the 
forms, checklists, and questionnaires used in 
performing peer reviews, and issued a new guide 
entitled “Suggestions for Writing Letters of Com­
ments." Such guidance is expected to effect 
greater uniformity in both the form and content 
of such letters in the future. In addition, review 
team captains were required to attend an all-day 
training program involving the above changes 
prior to performing peer reviews after August 1, 
1986. The training material focused on identify­
ing systemic deficiencies in quality controls.
Other Activities
In November 1986, the Committee met with 
the SEC Chief Accountant and members of his 
staff to discuss the effectiveness of modifications 
made in the peer review program during the year.
Members of the Committee and its staff also met 
with representatives of the Auditing Standards 
Board and Financial Accounting Standards Board 
to discuss practice problems that review teams en­
countered when performing this year's peer reviews.
Monitoring of MAS Engagements
The Section's membership requirements pro­
scribe member firms from performing certain 
types of management advisory services for SEC 
registrants whose financial statements the firm 
audits. Peer review teams review both the audit 
and MAS engagements performed for selected 
SEC clients to ascertain that (a) the MAS engage­
ment was not one proscribed by the Section, (b) 
the firm did not impair its independence by per­
forming the MAS engagement—i.e., by acting 
either in a decision-making role or as an 
employee—and (c) all major decisions made dur­
ing the course of performing the audit were objec­
tive. Particular emphasis was placed on clients 
where the fees for MAS equalled or exceeded the 
audit fee.
No instance was uncovered of violation of 
membership rules or impairment of independence 
and objectivity.
SEC Oversight of the Process
The SEC, through the Office of the Chief 
Accountant, has access to a sample of randomly- 
selected peer review workpapers, to POB workpa­
pers on all reviews, and to all documents in the 
Section's public file. This is necessary so the SEC 
can make an independent evaluation of the effec­
tiveness of the process. The SEC staff has substan­
tially completed its inspection of the 1986 
reviews; however, certain reviews in its sample of 
review team workpapers selected are not yet avail­
able because the reports have not yet been 
accepted by the Committee. The SEC staff has 
indicated that it is satisfied with both peer review 
and oversight performance on the reviews 
inspected to date.
In its annual report for 1986, as it has done in 
previous years, the SEC opined favorably on the 
process: “The Commission believes the peer review 
process contributes significantly to improving the 
quality control systems of member firms and 
thus should enhance the consistency and quality 
of practice before the Commission." 2 This convic­
tion has led the SEC to propose a rule for public 
comment that would require auditors who prac­
tice before the Commission to undergo triennial 
peer review by an approved peer review organiza­
tion (PRO) or by qualified reviewers under direct 
SEC supervision. According to that proposal, the 
Section and the POB would constitute such a 
PRO. The SEC observed in the background text of 
the proposal that: “The private sector approach 
currently embodied in the SECPS and POB struc­
ture has proved both effective and efficient..." 3
Benefits of Peer Review
Participants in the peer review program gener­
ally indicate that it is beneficial, as noted in the 
following news item that appeared in the June 
1987 issue of the Journal o f  A ccountancy:
“CPA Firms Report More Attention Paid to 
Quality. Of those accounting firms that are 
members of the Division for CPA firms of the 
American Institute of CPAs, 53% spend more 
time on quality control matters than they 
would if they were not required to do so in 
order to maintain membership, according to 
recent results of an AICPA survey. Of those 
surveyed, 94% reported that their peer review 
uncovered areas which they “really need to 
improve" and that needed changes were made. 
Of the respondents, 47% said that division 
membership can help a small firm hold exist­
ing clients and obtain new ones; 79% devel­
oped a quality control document because none 
previously existed; 47% sent personnel to 
training programs on quality control or peer 
review; and 64% said that a successful peer 
review helps in recruiting staff."
FOOTNOTES
1. The Private Companies Practice Section has a peer review program 
which for all intents and purposes is identical with the SEC Practice 
Section's program, except that it is not subject to oversight by a public 
board.
2. 53nd Annual Report of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
for the Fiscal Year Ended September 30, 1986, p. 25.
3. Securities Act of 1933 Release 6695, p. 48.
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Appendix B
Special
Investigative
Activities
The mission of the Special Investigations Commit­
tee (SIC) formed in November 1979 is to determine 
whether allegations of audit failure of a publicly- 
held client made against an SECPS member firm 
indicate the need for corrected measures by the 
member firm, and to obtain assurance that the 
member firm makes any modifications considered 
necessary. Of equal importance is the Committee's 
evaluation of whether professional standards and 
related guidance are adequate in the light of a spe­
cific or a series of alleged audit failures. The Com­
mittee's focus is on the future; therefore, the Com­
mittee's mission is not to decide whether the audit 
failure alleged to have occurred has in fact occurred. 
Nor is it the Committee's objective to discipline a 
firm or specific individuals for inadequate perfor­
mance on a given engagement.
C ases R ep orted
Member firms reported 44 cases to the SIC during 
the year ended June 30, 1987. In addition, the Com­
mittee reopened its files on two previously closed 
cases to consider whether actions taken by a regula­
tory agency against the firm or specified individuals 
had quality control implications not considered by 
the Committee in its initial evaluation.
In total, the Committee worked on 79 cases dur­
ing the year. Task forces consisting of one or two 
SIC members were assigned to all cases to evaluate 
the quality control implications of the allegations. 
The files on 50 cases were closed based upon the 
evaluation of the information gathered by task 
forces and Committee staff. A case file is closed 
only after the task force (and Committee) has gath­
ered and evaluated sufficient information to con­
clude that the firm has taken the corrective action 
deemed necessary by the Committee; in some 
cases, the Committee obtains added assurance by 
reviewing the results of the firm's next peer review.1 
Files on ten of the cases were closed only after the 
Committee had reviewed the findings of either a 
special review or a peer review in which the scope 
and procedures for review of portions of the firm's 
quality control system were specified by an SIC 
task force.
S pecial R ev iew s
Based upon its analysis of information obtained 
from discussions with firm representatives and 
their peer reviewers, the Committee required two 
firms to submit to special reviews during 1986-87. 
Those two firms accounted for five of the ten cases 
referred to in the preceding paragraph.
R ev iew  o f  Firm  A: Firm A was the subject of 
litigation that involved audits performed by person­
nel in one of its offices.
Prior to the commencement of the special review, 
the firm had assigned a team of competent inspec­
tors from several other offices of the firm to perform 
an intensive review (inspection) of that office, which 
encompassed a significant number of audit engage­
ments, including engagements performed by the 
engagement supervisory personnel involved in the 
litigation. After evaluating the findings of its inspec­
tion team, the firm took the following actions:
■ Assigned a new director of auditing in that office.
■ Reassessed the competence of a number of experi­
enced personnel and reassigned certain audit 
engagement responsibilities.
■ Required all audit engagements to be subjected to 
an additional level of review (concurring partner 
review).
■ Required all personnel in that office to attend 
training programs dealing with audit work consid­
ered deficient by the inspection team.
Even though the firm reported these findings and 
actions to the Committee, the Committee ordered a 
special review by a member of the SIC.
The assigned member visited the office, inter­
viewed key personnel, reviewed the detailed find­
ings of the firm's inspection team and resultant 
corrective action plan, reviewed a sample of audit 
engagements performed subsequent to the imple­
mentation of the corrective actions by personnel 
involved in the litigation, discussed appropriate 
matters with firm personnel, and evaluated whether 
the corrective actions produced the desired results. 
Based upon the assigned member's conclusion that 
the firm had taken appropriate and effective correc­
tive actions, the Committee closed its files on the 
cases involving that office of the firm.
R ev iew  o f  Firm B: Firm B was required to 
undergo a special review after the assigned SIC task 
force had ascertained (a) that the firm's quality con­
trol policies and procedures did not provide guid­
ance to its personnel when using non-supervisory 
personnel of another firm to perform extensive 
auditing procedures and (b) that the firm had used 
personnel of other firms on several other engage­
ments in circumstances in which the other firm 
was not independent.
Accordingly, by order of the Committee and under 
the direction and supervision of the assigned SIC 
task force, personnel drawn from other offices of the 
firm reviewed all engagements wherein non-firm 
personnel performed extensive audit procedures and 
a sample of other engagements supervised by the 
partner who had supervised the allegedly faulty 
audit. As a result of such review, the firm deter­
mined that additional auditing procedures were 
necessary to support the firm's opinion on the 
majority of these engagements. Those procedures 
were immediately performed.
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Depth of Inquiries Made by SIC Task Forces to Gain Assurance Regarding Adequacy of and Compliance with Firm’s 
Quality Control System Prior to Closing Files on 50 Cases During 1986-87
Review of 
Quality 
Control 
System 
of Firm
Review relevant 
aspects of firm’s 
quality control 
policies and 
procedures and 
compliance 
therewith.
In addition, the financial statements issued by 
one client and reported on by the firm were found to 
be in error (the error was not related to the use of 
non-firm personnel.) This engagement was per­
formed by an office other than the office which 
performed the allegedly faulty audit reported to the 
SIC. It was concluded that the report and financials 
need not be recalled since the following year's state­
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14
Case Files 
(28%)
18
Case Files 
(36%)
8
Case Files 
(16%)
Analysis of 
Allegations
Read complaint, 
relevant financial 
statements, and 
all other publicly 
available relevant 
materials.
General
Inquiries
Discuss issues 
addressed by 
allegations that 
have quality 
control implica­
tions with repre­
sentatives of the 
firm or its peer 
reviewers and, if 
appropriate, 
examine peer 
review and 
inspection 
results.
In-Depth
Inquiries
Discuss relevant 
quality control 
policies and 
procedures and 
compliance there­
with with firm 
personnel familiar 
with the case, 
review firm’s 
technical man­
uals, guidance 
materials and, 
when appropriate, 
audit documenta­
tion prepared in 
the performance 
of the audit in 
question.
50
Case Files
ments were soon to be published and the financials 
of the year in question would then be restated. The 
firm ordered that concurring reviews be performed 
by partners of another office on all engagements 
supervised by personnel of the office which issued 
the erroneous report.
The firm, as a direct result of this special review, 
also developed and distributed a policy statement 
and instructions regarding assignment of audit pro­
cedures to non-firm personnel.
A member of the task force tested and evaluated 
the effectiveness of the firm's internal review, its 
findings, and corrective actions. The member 
reported that the firm had made appropriate 
changes in its quality control policy and procedures 
and had taken appropriate actions concerning 
engagements that were considered to be substand­
ard. The Committee closed its file on the case but 
decided to review the results of the firm's next peer 
review.
Standard  R ev iew  P rocedures on O ther C ases
For each reported case, a task force of one or two 
Committee members studies the complaints, rele­
vant financial statements, and other available public 
documents, and considers whether allegations, if 
sustained, suggest a deficiency in the firm's quality 
control system.
As indicated, case files were closed only after 
special reviews had been performed; or the Commit­
tee reviewed did not lead it to conclude that the firms 
did not need to take corrective actions in addition to 
those that might have already been implemented.
The diligence of the Committee in discharging its 
responsibilities is evidenced by the fact that its task 
forces held a total of 60 meetings during the year 
with firm representatives; the firm's peer review 
team captain was in attendance at 11 of these 
meetings.
Special Investigations Committee Activity During the Year Ending June 30, 1987
Activity Relating to Quality Control Systems of Firms Reporting Cases
Files of open cases at July 1, 1986  .....................................................................................................................................................................33
N ew  cases reported by firm s during the y e a r .............................................................................................................................................44
C ase files reopened because of developm ents o ccu rrin g  after files were closed ..................................................................... 2
C ases acted  on by C o m m ittee  during y e a r ................................................................ ..................................................................................79
C ase files closed after:
Evaluation of the results of a special review or of specific procedures performed at its request in a
tim ely review  of the f i r m * ........................................................................................................................................................10
Evaluation of relevant quality control m aterials of the firm , such as tech n ical m an u als and
guidance m aterials, or the results of in ternal review s or in sp ectio n s............................................................. 26
C oncluding th at the allegations had no quality control im plications or were based on a
m isunderstanding of professional s ta n d a r d s ................................................................................................................14
C ase files closed during y e a r ................................................................................................................................................................................50
Files of open cases at June 30 , 1987  ................................................................................................................................................................ 29
Activity Relating to Review of Professional Standards
■ The A uditing Standards Board was asked to address the adequacy of guidance regarding:
□  T he degree to w hich  a firm  m u st supervise the perform ance of auditing procedures to  be performed by 
personnel of another accou ntin g  firm .
□  R eliance on opinions of non-accounting specialists, especially real estate appraisers.
□  A uditing of in vestm ents in unconsolidated affiliates not separately reported on.
□  R eliability of con firm ation s as evidentiary  m atter.
□  A uditing of deferred start-up  costs.
■ T he A ccou n ting  Standards E xecutive C om m ittee  was asked to  review professional literature concerning:
□  D isclosures of risks and u n certain ties.
□  D eferral of start-up  costs.
□  Acquisition, developm ent, and con stru ction  loans.
■ The Peer Review  C o m m ittee  was asked to  issue guidance to  peer reviewers to  give additional w eight in 
selecting engagem ents to  those where personnel of another accou ntin g firm  was used to  perform  substantial 
auditing procedures.
* The SIC frequently monitors the effectiveness of corrective actions instituted as a result of a special review by reviewing the results of the 
firm's next review. For example, during the year another task force evaluated the findings and reports of a peer review performed in 1986 
on a firm that had a special review in 1985.
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The extent of the review procedures necessary for 
the Committee to satisfy itself concerning the 
implications of a case for a firm's quality controls or 
for professional standards varies case by case. SIC 
task forces met with the engagement partners or the 
partners that performed a concurring review of the 
audit in litigation in 19 instances. In the other meet­
ings, national office personnel familiar with the 
case represented the firm. The nature of matters 
discussed by firm representatives and task forces 
included but was not limited to:
■ The firm's general views on the allegations and its 
basis for such views.
■ The current responsibilities of the engagement 
management team and concurring partner and 
whether any of their responsibilities had been 
changed since the litigation was filed.
■ The nature and timing of consultation that 
occurred during the performance of the engage­
ment, if any, on the matters that were the subject 
of litigation.
■ The current policies and procedures of the firm 
relative to matters that were the subject of the 
litigation, including technical accounting and 
auditing guidance materials relating to the 
industry.
■ The results of recent peer reviews and inspections 
of the offices and engagement supervisory person­
nel involved in the litigation.
■ Issues highlighted in recent peer review reports 
which appeared to be relevant to the allegations 
in the litigation.
Task forces generally requested and received from 
firms copies of relevant sections of their quality 
control policies and procedures and accounting and 
auditing guidance materials. In some cases, firms 
chose to provide documentation relevant to specific 
allegations to the task force even though they were 
not, at the time, expected to do so as a condition of 
SECPS membership.
The findings of the peer review of another firm, 
which was being monitored by the SIC, resulted in 
that firm installing special review procedures on all 
audits supervised by a partner involved in an alleg­
edly faulty audit. The Committee closed its file on 
this case after obtaining assurance that the special 
monitoring procedures would be implemented 
effectively.
The accompanying chart indicates the depth of 
inquiry performed by task forces for the 50 cases 
closed by the Committee during the year.
Corrective Actions by Firms 
As implied in the "Special Reviews" section, it is 
common for a firm which has been sued for an 
alleged audit failure to conduct a special internal 
review. Procedures in such internal review include:
■ A thorough review of the engagement in question.
■ A review of other engagements performed by the 
engagement supervisory team and the concurring 
reviewer.
■ A review of internal firm guidance materials 
relating to the issues raised in the litigation.
Some internal reviews performed in 1986 were
much broader in scope and encompassed a review of 
the structure, organization, and operations of the 
office in question, including how it assigns and 
promotes personnel and whether specified quality 
control policies were being complied with.
Such reviews provide the firm with a reevaluation 
of its performance on the engagement in question, 
another evaluation of the quality of work performed 
by personnel involved in the engagement, and addi­
tional evidence as to the effectiveness of firm-wide 
policies and procedures. These reviews, like peer 
reviews and the annual inspection program, reduce 
the firm's potential for future audit failure.
The results of internal reviews are confidential. 
However, except for the results of the review of the 
engagement in question which are normally legally 
privileged, SIC task forces have been given access to 
the findings of internal reviews conducted by firms 
when the SIC task forces have concluded that such 
access is desirable. In such cases, the Committee is 
thereby provided with documentation relevant to 
the competence and performance of selected super­
visory personnel, the effectiveness of the firm's 
quality control policies and procedures, and the 
adequacy of the firm's accounting and auditing guid­
ance. Therefore, the need for special review by the 
SIC is often, but not always, obviated.
Corrective actions taken by member firms during 
1986-87, either on their own initiative or at the 
insistence of the Committee, included:
■ Reassignment of responsibilities of certain firm 
personnel.
■ Development and presentation of, or required 
participation in, specified continuing professional 
education programs.
■ Closer supervision of work performed by specified 
individuals.
■ Development and distribution of internal guid­
ance materials for audits of companies in special­
ized industries.
Summary of SIC Activity 
The SIC has two distinct responsibilities: (1) to 
determine whether the allegations of audit failure 
made against SECPS member firms indicate the 
need for corrective measures by those firms and (2) 
to determine whether an individual case (or several 
cases) indicates a possible need for standard-setting 
bodies to reconsider professional standards and 
related guidance materials. The activities of the 
Committee and the results obtained from such 
activities are summarized in the accompanying 
table.
In addition, the SIC referred two cases to the Pro­
fessional Ethics Division for its review as to 
whether the performance of the supervisory person­
nel on the engagements was in accordance with 
professional ethical standards.
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Appendix C
Executive
Committee
Activities
The audit process and the concomitant subject of 
auditors' responsibility were the focus of study by 
several groups, including the Section's Executive 
Committee, the AICPA's Auditing Standards Board, 
and the National Commission on Fraudulent Finan­
cial Reporting, among others.
The Executive Committee concluded that more 
effective communication between the auditor and 
the audit committee is desirable. Accordingly, the 
Executive Committee enacted a membership 
requirement to enhance audit committee-auditor 
communications. Member firms are now required 
to communicate, at least annually, the following 
matters to audit committees:
■ Material errors or irregularities that occurred and 
were corrected in the period reported on and pos­
sible illegal acts insofar as those matters may 
bear on management integrity and the adequacy 
of internal controls.
■ Material weaknesses in internal control which, if 
not eliminated, reduce the likelihood that the 
entity's control procedures would detect a mate­
rial error or irregularity.
■ Opinions on GAAP and GAAS matters sought by
management from other auditors and the conclu­
sions reached by management of the entity and 
the auditor with respect to matters covered by 
those opinions.  
■ Disagreements with management on significant 
accounting, auditing, and reporting matters 
which, if not satisfactorily resolved, would have 
resulted in qualification of the auditor's report.
■ Accounting and disclosure considerations associ­
ated with significant contingencies presenting 
especially difficult measurement problems and 
which therefore are susceptible to subsequent 
revision.
■ Accounting and disclosure considerations associ­
ated with unusual transactions which may have 
implications for assessing the quality of earnings.
■ Adoption by management of an accounting princi­
ple if application of another applicable accounting 
principle would have had a materially different 
effect on the financials.
The Committee adopted this membership 
requirement even though it was aware that the 
Auditing Standards Board was considering incorpo­
rating such a requirement as part of generally 
accepted auditing standards and subsequently
issued an exposure draft of a statement on this 
subject. Such action by the Section is n o t 
unprecedented.
The Committee required member firms early in 
1986 to establish policies and procedures concern­
ing the expression of an opinion to nonaudit clients 
on the application of generally accepted accounting 
principles. It removed this requirement in Decem­
ber 1986, after the Auditing Standards Board issued 
an auditing standard delineating procedures all 
audit firms must follow in such circumstances.
In September 1986, the Committee appointed the 
Task Force on SIC Methodology and charged it with 
reviewing the objectives and operations of the Spe­
cial Investigations Committee and making recom­
mendations to enhance its effectiveness and credi­
bility. This action was taken primarily because (1) 
SEC Chief Accountant Sampson had indicated that 
the SEC did not have sufficient access to the SIC 
process to permit the SEC to form an independent 
judgment of its effectiveness, and (2) the POB had 
urged that such a review be made and had proposed 
a more structured approach to be used by the SIC in 
its evaluations of the quality control implications of 
allegations of substandard audit performance.
The Committee accepted the task force's report at 
a special meeting in April 1987. The task force con­
cluded that the mission of the SIC should not be 
changed; its primary objective should continue to 
be to complement the peer review process by evalu­
ating the quality control implications of alleged 
audit failures. The Executive Committee approved 
and adopted five of the six recommendations 
advanced by the task force. The recommendations 
that were adopted, in summary, are:
■ The SIC should adopt a more structured approach 
in evaluating and acting on reported cases.
■ Provision is made for SIC task forces to access, 
when appropriate, selected documentation pre­
pared in the course of performing the audit 
engagement in question.
■ The SEC is to be provided more meaningful 
reports of the actions and findings of the SIC on 
reported cases.
■ SIC representatives should meet periodically with 
the SEC Chief Accountant and members of his 
staff.
The Executive Committee considered a report 
published by the Public Oversight Board, "Public 
Perceptions of Management Advisory Services Per­
formed by CPA Firms for Audit Clients," which 
reported the results of a survey conducted for the 
Board by Audits & Surveys, Inc. In light of the pub­
lic perception about CPA firms performing certain 
types of MAS for audit clients, the Executive Com­
mittee directed its Planning Subcommittee to moni­
tor carefully developments regarding the perfor­
mance of MAS.
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Appendix D
Membership Data 
and
Requirements
One thousand seven hundred and ten firms are 
members of the Division for CPA Firms: 385 belong 
to both the SEC Practice Section and the Private 
Companies Practice Section, 10 belong only to the 
SEC Practice Section, and 1,315 belong only to the 
Private Companies Practice Section.
Membership in the Division increased steadily 
throughout the year. After considering adjustment 
for mergers between member firms, the number of 
firms in the SEC Practice Section increased during
the year by 14, and the number of firms in the Pri­
vate Companies Practice Section increased by 155. 
Details are shown in Tables 1 and 2.
Membership Requirements 
A firm that voluntarily joins the SEC Practice 
Section agrees to abide by the Section's stringent 
membership requirements which include, among 
others:
■ Undergoing an independent triennial review of its 
quality control system.
■ Rotating the partner-in-charge of each audit of an 
SEC registrant at least every seven years.
■ Requiring review by a second partner, in addition 
to the engagement partner, of the audit report, 
financial statements, and selected workpapers of 
the audit of each SEC registrant.
TABLE 1 Analysis of Membership in the Division for CPA Firms by Number of SEC Clients and by Section— 
July 1, 1986 to June 30, 1987
Firms with one or 
more SEC clients
S E C P S -o n ly ............. 4 — 4 3 1 < 1 > — 7
Both sections . . . . 174 5 169 8 9 < 6 > < 5 > 175
P C P S -o n ly ................ 122 3 119 20 < 9 > < 5 > < 9 > 116
Totals ................... 3 0 0 8 2 9 2 31 1 <  1 2 > <  1 4 > 29 8
Firms with no 
SEC clients
S E C P S -on ly ............. 4 — 4 — — < 1 > — 3
Both sections . . . . 2 0 9 5 2 0 4 16 < 6 > < 9 > 5 21 0
P C P S -o n ly ................ 1,061 8 1,053 20 9 5 <77 > 9 1,199
Totals ................... 1 ,274 13 1,261 22 5 < 1 > <  8 7 > 14 1,412
All firms
S E C P S -o n ly ............. 8 — 8 3 1 < 2 > — 10
Both sections . . . . 3 8 3 10 3 7 3 24 3 <  1 5 > — 3 8 5
P C P S -o n ly ................ 1 ,183 11 1 ,172 22 9 < 4 > < 8 2 > — 1,315
Totals ................... 1 ,574 21 1,553 25 6 — < 9 9 > — 1,710
* All 10 firms that were members of both sections merged with other firms that are members of both sections. Of the 11 PCPS-only firms that 
merged, 9 merged with firms that are members of both sections and 2 merged with other PCPS-only members.
TABLE 2 Analysis of Membership in the Division for CPA Firms—July 1, 1986 to June 30, 1987
Division for CPA Firms SEC Practice Section
Increase
July 1, 1986 June 30, 1987 Increase July 1, 1986 June 30, 1987 < Decrease >
No. of f i r m s .............................. 1 ,553*  1 ,710  157 3 8 1 *  3 9 5  14
No. of SEC audit clients . .  1 3 ,326  14 ,357  1,031 13 ,118  14 ,155  1,037
No. of practice u n i t s ........... 3 ,731  3 ,8 6 3  132 2 ,0 1 9  1 ,946  < 7 3 >
No. of professionals ........... 113 ,551  1 1 8 ,0 9 7  4 ,5 4 6  9 7 ,1 8 0  9 9 ,8 4 7  2 ,6 6 7
* Restated for mergers between member firms July 1, 1986 to June 30, 1987.
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Number of Firms
Analysis of Auditors of Publicly-traded Companies Listed in the Sixteenth Edition of Who Audits America *
Audited by Members of the Division for CPA Firms
7,168 companies (89.3%) with
  combined sales o f $3,423,947,000,000 (99.7%) 1,387 companies (99.9%) 
with combined sales of 
$2,896,742,000,000 (99.96%)
5,139 companies (85.9%)
  with combined sales of 
$426,133,000,000 (98.5%)
642 companies (97.7%)
  with combined sales o f 
$101,072,000,000 (98.8%)
□
□
Companies whose stocks 
are listed on
New York Stock Exchange
Companies whose stocks 
are listed on
American Stock Exchange
□ Companies whose stocks are traded Over-the-counter
Audited by U.S. CPA Firms that are not members 
of the Division for CPA Firms
861 companies (10.7%) 
with combined sales 
of $9,027,000,000 (0.3%)
844 companies (14.1 %) 
-with combined sales of 
$6,597,000,000 (1.5%)
15 companies (2.3%) 
-with combined sales of 
$1,241,000,000 (1.2%)
2 companies (0.1  
with combined sales of 
$1,189,000,000 (0.04%)
 Analysis limited to companies whose stocks are actively traded and for whom Who Audits America reports financial 
information for 1984 or later.
■ Reporting specified information to audit commit­
tees of SEC clients.
■ Reporting litigation alleging failure to conduct an 
audit of an SEC registrant in accordance with 
professional standards.
■ Refraining from providing specified consulting 
services to SEC audit clients.
■ Requiring all professionals in the firm to take 
part in prescribed levels of qualifying continuing 
professional education.
Auditors of Publicly-traded Companies
Firms that are members of the Division serve as
auditors for the overwhelming majority of compa­
nies whose stocks are publicly-traded.
An analysis prepared by the Public Oversight 
Board of companies listed in the sixteenth edition 
of Who Audits A m erica  and for whom Who Audits 
A m erica  had financial statements dated 1984 or 
later reveals that 89.3% of the companies are 
audited by member firms and that the sales of those 
companies account for over 99% of the aggregate 
sales volume of all publicly-traded companies. The 
majority of these companies are audited by firms 
that belong to the SEC Practice Section. All but two 
companies whose stocks are listed on the New York 
Stock Exchange are audited by members of the SEC
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Practice Section, and all but 15 companies whose 
stocks are listed on the American Stock Exchange 
are audited by members of the Division. Details are 
shown in the accompanying chart.
MAS Engagements for SEC Audit Clients
Member firms are required to report certain infor­
mation regarding fees received for management 
advisory services engagements, including MAS fees
received from SEC registrants for whom the firm 
also serves as auditor. Such information is reported 
in the firm's annual report to the AICPA which is 
placed in a public file. Analysis of the data reveals 
that in 1986 member firms performed no MAS 
engagements for 79.8% of their SEC registrant audit 
clients and that MAS fees were greater than audit 
fees in less than 1% of the cases. Details are shown 
in Table 3.
TABLE 3 Analysis of Ratio of MAS Fees to Audit Fees Received from SEC Registrants
Number of Firms Number of SEC Audit Clients Classified by Percent of MAS Fee to Audit Fee
Classified by Number -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
of SEC Clients 0% 1-25% 26-50% 51-100% over 100% Total
Firms (12) with 100 or
more SEC audit clients .. 10,567 2,094 254 199 114 13,228
Firms (11) with 20 to 99
SEC audit clients............  393 35 5 5 4 442
Firms (159) with fewer
than 20 SEC audit clients 345 130 8 4 0 487
Totals ............................ 11,305 2,259 267 208 118 14,157
Percents ........................ 79.8% 16.0% 1.9% 1.5% 0.8% 100.0%
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